Uncertainty and investment in private sector: An analytical argument and a review of the economy of Iran by Mellati, Ali
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Uncertainty and investment in private
sector: An analytical argument and a
review of the economy of Iran
Ali Mellati
Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics
March 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26655/
MPRA Paper No. 26655, posted 14. November 2010 18:36 UTC
 UNCERTAINTY AND INVESTMENT IN PRIVATE SECTOR: 
AN ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT AND A REVIEW OF THE  
ECONOMY OF IRAN 
 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE  
GOKHALE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ECONOMICS  
 
BY 
 
ALI    MELLATI 
 
 
 
 
UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF 
Dr. SIDDHARTHA    MITRA 
 
 
 
 
 
GOKALE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 
(DEEMED TO BE A UNIVERSITY) 
PUNE - 411 004 
INDIA 
MARCH, 2008 
 
  ii 
Contents 
List of Tables iv 
List of Figures          v 
Acronyms          vi 
Acknowledgement         vii 
 
Chapter I 
Introduction          1 
 
1.1- Introduction         1 
1.2- Literature Review        9 
1.2.1- Traditional Finance        11 
1.2.2- Adjustment – Cost Approach       13
  
1.2.3- Irreversibility Approach       15
  
1.2.4- Covariance Approach        21 
1.2.5- Adjustment-Cost or Irreversibility?      22 
1.2.6- Empirical Studies        24
  
Chapter II 
A Review of Economy of Iran       27 
 
2.1- Economy of Iran         27 
2.2- Uncertainties and Economy of Iran      34 
 
Chapter III 
Theory          37 
 
 
Chapter IV 
Methodology, Estimation and Analysis      55 
 
4.1- Data And Data Preparation Process      55 
4.2- Methodology         62 
4.3- Uncertainty About Macroeconomic Variables     63 
4.3.1- Unit Root Test         63 
4.3.2- Poolability         64 
4.3.3- Outliers          66 
4.3.4- Fixed Effects         66 
4.3.5- Estimator Selection Strategy       68 
4.3.6- Multicollinearity        73 
4.3.7- Estimation         74 
4.4- Uncertainty about Socio-Political Institutions and conflicts   76 
4.5- Uncertainty about The Quality of Public Governance    80 
4.6- Outcomes Analysis        81 
 
  iii 
Chapter V 
Conclusion          97 
 
5.1- Summary          97 
5.2- Empirical Findings        102 
5.3- Policy implications        104 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A          107 
Appendix B          112 
Appendix C          123 
 
Bibliography                      139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iv 
List of Tables 
Table  1.1- Comparison of GDP per capita and private investment rates among  
                  selected countries.  3 
Table  1.2- Real and nominal interest rates for India and China.   6 
Table  2.1- Comparison of socio-economical indices in Iran.    27 
Table C1- List of MA processes.       123 
Table C2- List of variables.        124 
Table C3- Summary statistics of data.      125 
Table C4- Pairwise correlation of independent variables in macroeconomic  
                 panel.                         126 
Table C5- Pairwise correlation among socio-political institutions and conflicts 
                  panel.   126 
Table C6- Pairwise correlation of governance quality variables.   126 
Table C7- List of the countries.       127 
Table C8- Results for Maddala and Wu unit root test.    128 
Table C9- Results for cross validation.      129 
Table C10- Results for macroeconomic uncertainty panel estimation.  130 
Table C11- Results for socio-political institutions anf conflicts.   131 
Table C12- Outcome for quality of governance uncertainty.    132 
Table C13-Outcomes of VIF test for macroeconomics uncertainty panel 
                   (without uncertainty of real interest rate).   133 
Table C14-Outcomes of VIF test for macroeconomics uncertainty panel 
                   (without uncertainty of inflation).   134 
Table C15- Outcomes of VIF test for panel a, socio-political uncertainty and  
                   conflicts.          135 
Table C16- Outcomes of VIF test for panel b,  socio-political uncertainty and 
                    conflicts.         136 
Table C17- Outcomes of VIF test for panel c,  socio-political uncertainty and 
                    conflicts.         137 
Table C18- Outcomes of VIF test for quality of governance.   138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  v 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1-GDP per capita of Iran from 1974 to 2000  
                  (U.S. $ constant prices of year 2000).   28 
Figure 2.2-Private investment rate in Iran and India since 1971 to 2000.  29 
Figure 2.3-Fluctuations of inflation, nominal and real interest rates since 1988  
                  to 2000 in Iran.        30 
Figure 2.4-Fluctuations of nominal interest rate and rate of private investment. 31 
 Figure 2.5-Comparision between fluctuations of real interest rate and rate of  
                   private investment in Iran.      32 
Figure 2.6-Variation of inflation and the rate of private investment in Iran.  32 
Figure 2.7-The price of crude oil ($ U.S.) and the rate of private investment 
                   (% GDP).         33 
Figure3.1          45 
Figure3.2          46 
Figure3.3          47 
Figure3.4          49 
Figure3.5          50 
Figure3.6          53 
Figure3.7          53 
Figure B1- Uncertainty about credit to private sector vs private investment rate. 112                   
Figure B2- Uncertainty about exchange rate distortion vs private investment rate. 113       
Figure B3- Uncertainty about growth vs private investment rate.   113 
Figure B4- Uncertainty about real interest rate vs private investment rate.  114 
Figure B5- Uncertainty about trade vs private investment rate.   114 
Figure B6- Uncertainty about terms of trade vs private investment rate.  115 
Figure B7- Uncertainty about inflation vs private investment rate.   115 
Figure B8- Inequality vs private investment rate.     116 
Figure B9- Democracy vs private investment rate.     116 
Figure B10- War vs private investment rate.      117 
Figure B11- civil war vs private investment rate.     117 
Figure B12- Revolution vs private investment rate.     118 
Figure B13- Constitutional change vs private investment rate.   118 
Figure B14- Coups va private investment rate.     119 
Figure B15- Riots vs private investment rate.     120 
Figure B16- Strikes vs private investment rate.     120 
Figure B17- Purges vs private investment rate.     120 
Figure B18- Assassination vs private investment rate.    121 
Figure B19- Box plot of macroeconomic uncertainty panel.    121 
Figure B20- Box plot of socio-political institutions and conflicts panel.  122 
Figure B21- Box plot of the panel of the quality of governance.   122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vi 
Acronyms 
AR Auto Regressive 
ARDL Auto Regressive Distributed Lag 
CAPM   Capital Asset Pricing Model 
COW Correlates of War 
DL Distributed Lag 
EHII Estimated Household Income Inequality Dataset 
FEVD Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition 
FGLS Feasible Generalized Least Square 
ICPSR Inter-University Consortium of Political and 
Social    Research at the University of Michigan  
LDV Lagged Dependent Variable 
LSDV Least Square Dummy Variable 
MA Moving Average 
OLS Ordinary Least Square 
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PCSE Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
SSE Sum of Squares of Errors 
TSCS Time Series-Cross Section  
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization 
UTIP University of Texas Inequality Project 
VIF Variance Inflation Factor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vii 
Acknowledgements 
 
This thesis is the end of my long journey in obtaining my degree in 
Economics. However, adventurous expeditions for discovery of new fields will never 
be finished. I have not traveled in a vacuum in this journey. There are some people 
who made this journey easier and more intellectually satisfying with words of 
encouragement and by offering different places to look to expand my ideas and 
analyses.  
First, very special thanks to my supervisor Dr. Siddhartha Mitra. He gave me 
the confidence and support in the beginning of my Ph.D program in Economics when 
I was groping to find my way. His insight, knowledge and enormous grasp of 
Economics and Econometrics inspired me. He patiently spared his time and went 
through several drafts of this work, challenged analytical and logical weakness in it 
and provided constructive suggestions, which definitely improved my knowledge of 
the subject and analyses.  
I would like to thank my family, on whose constant encouragement and love I 
have relied throughout my time at the Institute. I am grateful to my parents for their 
continuous support and my wife for her endurance. Their unflinching courage and 
conviction is constantly inspiring me, and I hope to continue, in my own way, toward 
the future. I have no words to express what and how much I owe them. 
I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the support of some very special 
individuals. They helped me immensely by giving me encouragement, friendship and 
by their valuable comments. They mirrored back my ideas so I heard them aloud, an 
important process in shaping this thesis: Prof. Rajas K. Parchure, Dr. Smriti 
Mukherjee, Kambiz Ahmadi and Saeed Sepehrvand. 
 
  viii 
I express my gratitude to the research staff, library staff and computer section 
staff for all the assistance provided to me during my work. 
Finally I have to sincerely thank Keyvan Aghayani and Vahid Meithami. 
Without their help I could not have joined the Institute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
1.1- Introduction 
The bearing of uncertainty and instability on private investment, an issue of 
concern for policy-makers, has been given considerable attention in the analytical and 
empirical literature. The issue is important owing to the fact that the lessening of 
extended poverty and unemployment on the one hand and the achievement of 
sustainable development on the other hand depends on the increase in private 
investment. The World Development Report (World Bank, 2005b) says: 
Private firms—from farmers and micro-entrepreneurs to local 
manufacturing companies and multinational enterprises—are at the heart of the 
development process. Driven by the quest for profits, they invest in new ideas and 
new facilities that strengthen the foundation of economic growth and prosperity. 
They provide more than 90 percent of jobs, creating opportunities for people to 
apply their talents and improve their situations. They provide the goods and 
services needed to sustain life and improve living standards. They are also the 
main source of tax revenues, contributing to public funding for health, education, 
and other services. Firms are thus critical actors in the quest for growth and 
poverty reduction. 
 Recent studies have shown that private investment is more efficient and 
productive than public investment (Serven and Solimano, 1991 and Kahn and 
Reinhart, 1990). For the same reasons, public investment cannot adequately resolve 
the aforementioned problems.  Due to mismanagement, public enterprises are plagued 
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by inefficiency. World Development Report (2005) has quoted from Pinheiro et al. 
(2001) that growth without an enhanced private sector is possible but unlikely to be 
sustained. For instance, Pinheiro et al. characterize Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s: 
 They experienced strong growth while closing domestic markets to 
international competition and pursuing heavy public investment through state-
owned enterprises. The initial results were impressive, but the growth proved 
unsustainable. Protected firms lacked the incentives to improve their productivity 
and fell further behind international best practices. Other firms had less access to 
new technologies and had to pay higher prices for inputs supplied by protected 
sectors. Public investment to sustain growth led to severe debt problems— and 
ultimately to a macroeconomic crisis. 
Thus, the public sector not only is incapable of providing a permanent solution 
to problems but also adds to other difficulties. Conversely, private sector is driven by 
economic incentives. The significance of profitability constrains them to use scarce 
resources in the best way for production and investment; this often paves the way for 
an increase in employment, reduction of poverty, sustainable development and 
growth.  
But, how should the private sector be encouraged to invest more? What causes 
differences in country wise participation of private sector in investment? Table-1.1 
indicates private investment (percentage of GDP) and GDP per capita (constant 2000 
U.S. $) in 1980, 1990 and 1999 for six countries. It shows that in 1980, Argentina had 
the same private investment rate as Malaysia, but 4 times the per capita GDP. In this 
year, Iran at six times the per capita GDP of India had the same private investment 
rate. In 1990, Malaysia with 50% of the per capita GDP of Argentina had 2.3 times 
the private investment rate. Simultaneously, South Africa at ten times per capita GDP 
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of India had a lower rate of private investment. There is an analogous comparison 
between Argentina and China in 1999. In 1999, India with a lower per capita GDP 
than Iran, Malaysia and South Africa had a higher rate of private investment. In 1999 
Argentina had a lower private investment rate than in 1980 despite a higher per capita 
GDP.  
Table-1.2 shows nominal and real interest rates and share of private 
investment in China and India for 1980, 1990 and 2000. China has increased 4.6 times 
the private investment rate despite a 6.8 times growth in its real interest rate between 
1980 and 1999. Similarly, we observe an increase in the private investment rate in 
India in spite of the growth in the real interest rate in this period. Furthermore, private 
investment does not show reasonable reaction to nominal rate fluctuations from 1980 
to 1990 and from 1990 to 2000. As Modigliani and Miller (1958) mention: “at the 
macroeconomic level there are ample grounds for doubting that the rate of interest 
has as large and as direct an influence on the rate of investment…”   
      
Year
1980 1990 1999
GDP per 
capita
Private 
Investment
GDP per 
capita
Private 
Investment
GDP per 
capita
Private 
Investment
Argentina 7551 19.2 5643 9.4 8062 16.1
China 173 3.7 364 8.3 798 17
India 222 10.1 316 13.9 440 14.9
Iran 1278 11.4 1196 8.5 1460 13
Malaysia 1848 19.5 2498 20.9 3653 11.3
South Africa 3436 13.3 3058 12.9 2881 10.3  
Table 1.1- Comparison of GDP per capita and private investment rates among selected countries. 
Initial theories of private investment emphasized the importance of reduction 
of interest rate and increase in output as channels in encouraging private investment. 
Keynes (1936) explicitly demonstrates that investment will occur to the level at which 
marginal efficiency equals the current rate of interest. Hence, a decrease in the rate of 
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interest will increase investment. The flexible accelerator model is the departure point 
from a handful of investment behavior theories. Flexible accelerator mechanism 
shows that 
]][1[ 1
*
1   tttt KKKK   
Denoting the level of capital in period t by Kt and the desired level of capital 
by K*t , capital is adjusted toward its desired level by a fraction of the difference 
between desired and actual capital in each period. If δ denotes the rate of replacement 
then we can have  
11
* ]][1[   tttt KKKI         (1) 
Accelerator theory, liquidity theory, expected profit theory differ in 
specification of the desired level of capital1. However, Jorgenson (1963) mentions 
that:  
It is difficult to reconcile the steady advance in the acceptance of the 
neoclassical theory of capital with the steady march of the econometric literature 
in a direction which appears to be diametrically opposite…Both profits and 
capacity theories have tried a rate of interest here or a price of investment goods 
there. By and large these efforts have been unsuccessful. 
In their search for an econometrically significant model, Jorgenson (1963) and 
Jorgenson and Siebert (1968 a, b) formulated a new neoclassical theory for 
investment. In this theory the desired capital stock is equal to the value of output 
deflated by the price of capital services where the later is denoted by Ct: 
])1[(
)1(
1
t
tt
ttt
t
t
t q
qq
rwu
u
q
C 



      (2) 
                                                
1 - Jorgenson and Siebert (1968a) might be studied for more details. 
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where qt is the investment good price index, δ the rate of replacement, rt the 
cost of capital, ut the rate of taxation of corporate income, and wt the proportion of 
depreciation at replacement cost deductible from income for tax purposes. This 
equation says that the price of capital services is equal to the depreciation at current 
cost minus tax saving due to depreciation plus the cost per unit capital minus the 
accrued capital gains. Then, the neo-classical model specifies 
t
tt
t C
QP
K *      (3) 
Where, PtQt is the value of output and α is the elasticity of output with respect 
to capital. The desired level of capital is a function of value of output and the rental 
price of capital services calculated in equation (2). Then, with substitution of the 
expression for  from (2) and the expression for *tK from (3) in equation (1), 
investment is calculated as a function of output and rental value of capital services. 
This rental value is calculated through a shadow or accounting price for capital 
services that depends on the cost of capital, the price of investment goods, the rate of 
change of this price, and the tax structure for business income.  
Romer (1996) mentions that this model does not consider any mechanism 
through which expectations affect investment demand. For instance, in developing 
countries, policies which seek to achieve aforementioned objectives (e.g. poverty, 
unemployment or growth) might end up boosting demand for money for consumption 
and not for investment. The result can be either a financial crisis (e.g. Latin America 
or Africa) or an increase in the inflation rate (e.g. Iran).  
Such criticisms have caused researchers to recognize uncertainty as the third 
factor which affects private investment.  
  6 
Year
1980 1990 2000
 interest rate private 
investment
(%)
interest rate private 
investment
(%)
 interest  rate private 
investment
(%)
real nominal real nominal real nominal
China 1.21 5.04 3.7 3.49 9.36 8.3 4.86 5.85 17
India 4.48 16.5 10.1 5.39 16.5 13.9 8.19 12.3 14.9  
Table 1.2- Real and nominal interest rates for India and China. 
As a starting point consider a conventional NPV model under certainty: 
  

N
t
t
t
i
X
INPV
1
0
1
       , t  = 1 to N 
where NPV  is expected net present value, tX denotes expected cash flow in 
period t 2, i is the risk-free rate of interest, N is the time span of the project and I0 
denotes the initial cash outlay. Investment is a long-run plan. The investor expects to 
maximize his profit during a defined lifetime. Therefore, he tries to predict the future 
flows of profits, and compute its present value. Only, projects with positive NPV  are 
candidates for acceptance. What happens if the investor cannot accurately forecast 
future flows and there is a difference between ex-ante and ex-post flows rendering the 
predictions unreliable? In this situation the investor adjusts his discount rate using the 
following formula: 
  

N
t
t
t
k
X
IANPV
1
0
1
       , t  = 1 to N 
Where ANPV  is the adjusted net present value and k denotes the risk-adjusted 
interest rate based on the perceived degree of project risk. Therefore, higher the 
                                                
 
2 - 


N
i
ii XpX
1
 , where X   denotes the expected value of cash flow, Xi is the possible amount of 
cash flow i, and pi is the probability of cash flow i occurring .   
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observed riskiness of a project, the greater the risk premium to be added to the risk-
free interest rate. This results in a higher discount rate and, thus, a lower net present 
value. Because, relative to the initial situation, an investor looks for a higher expected 
rate of return, the number of positive ANPV  projects and therefore acceptable 
investment opportunities will be less than positive NPV projects. This occurs because 
the future is unclear. Takii (2004) demonstrates how the ability to predict positively 
affects the investment through its impact on adjustment cost of capital stock. But the 
problem is that there is a delicate difference between risk and uncertainty. According 
to Pike and Neal (1996): 
Risk refers to the set of unique consequences for a given decision which 
can be assigned probabilities, while uncertainty implies that it is not fully 
possibly to identify outcomes or to assign probabilities. Perhaps the worst forms 
of uncertainty are the unknown unknowns – outcomes from events that we did not 
even consider. 
In case of risk there is a probability distribution of future flows that form the 
basis of studies but there is no index showing the magnitude of uncertainty. How can 
we anticipate the probability of a coup, revolution or war in a country? How can we 
determine the effect of bad governance on our industry? We need to consider the 
factors, which could generate such unknown circumstances to study the effect of these 
factors on aggregate private investment in a country.  
I define an element of uncertainty as any factor by which distorts information 
and predictions about the future. Often, studies concentrate on uncertainty about 
prices, demand or costs and deal with them by maximizing the value of the firm’s 
expectation of all future probable receipts. But, by foregoing definition, it embraces a 
wide range of factors that bring about not only unpredictable fluctuations in prices but 
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also affect the state of confidence of entrepreneurs and their trust on information at 
hand. So, there must be a time horizon for each project within which entrepreneurs 
can rely on their information and assess their projects through the maximization of 
expected value of all probable future revenues. This time horizon depends on factors 
causing uncertainty that could result an optimistic or pessimistic atmosphere in 
business. Unpredictable changes in the macroeconomic environment, institutions and 
quality of governance could be a type of uncertainty. For instance, consider a case in 
which there is a potential of civil war in a country. The questions that can quickly 
emerge among investors are: would a civil war arise? If yes, would it be harmful to 
our business and investment or even our lives? Who will win the war? Would there be 
any change in the law, rights and bureaucracy procedures after civil war? All of these 
questions render investors more hesitant about undertaking investment. The role of 
uncertainty can be compared with environmental conditions (e.g. temperature or 
pressure) or catalysts in chemical reactions. These factors do not have any direct 
participation in a reaction, and there is no reaction without suitably high incidence of 
these factors. Therefore, instead of assessing the impact of unpredictable future 
receipts on private investment, the direct effect of each possible factor of uncertainty 
on the private investment rate is examined in this study.  
The objectives of the study are: 
Main objective: 
 To ascertain the impact of uncertainty on the private investment rate. 
Sub-objectives: 
 To identify the different types of uncertainty. 
 To determine the significance of each type on private investment. 
 
  9 
And based on these objectives the testable hypotheses are: 
 H1: Uncertainty about macroeconomic outcomes and policy changes decreases 
private investment. 
  H2: Uncertainty about quality of public governance has a negative effect on 
private investment. 
 H3: Uncertainty about socio-political institutions and conflicts decreases 
private investment. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The second part of this 
chapter is dedicated to a literature review. In chapter two I elaborate in the economy 
of Iran. A new theory of uncertainty and investment is explained in chapter three. 
Methodology, estimation and outcome analysis are explained in chapter four. Chapter 
five concludes. 
1.2- Literature Review 
The classification of different theories of investment under uncertainty has 
been presented in chart-1.1. They diverge through their different definitions of 
uncertainty and different assumptions about conditions in which the investment 
decision is taken. The post-Keynesians and neo-classics differ essentially through 
their definition of uncertainty. I will explain precisely the post-Keynesian method and 
its difference with neo-classics later in chapter 3.  
Neo-classical methods focus on uncertainty about the components of the profit 
function (e.g. demand and price of output, costs etc.) where profits are derived from 
the process of production while traditional finance has focused on streams of profits 
from securities (and not dividend) in stock markets. The neo-classical method takes 
two separate routes: 
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Chart 1.1- Classification of the methods in dealing with uncertainty in investment theory. 
The first one, which is denoted by Variance, considers a firm by itself 
divorced from the existence of other projects and emphasizes the variation of some 
component of environment of a project (e.g. demand, costs, etc.) as uncertainty. The 
second, which is represented by covariance, emphasizes on the relationship between 
one firm and other firms in the market and relates the uncertainty to the pair wise 
covariance of their returns. Neo-classical methods, which emphasize on the variance 
as a proxy of uncertainty, diverge in two separate channels again. According to Abel 
and Eberly (1994): 
The firm’s investment decision becomes an interesting dynamic problem, 
in which anticipations about the future economic environment affect current 
investment, when frictions prevent instantaneous and costless adjustment of the 
Post-Keynesian 
Neo-classics 
Traditional finance 
Marginal efficiency  
User cost of capital 
Adjustment cost of capital 
Irreversibility 
Variance 
Covariance 
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capital stock. Literatures focused on two types of frictions: adjustment costs and 
irreversibility. 
Adjustment cost literature is based on the study of Eisner and Strotz (1963). It 
assumes that firms face extra costs of adjusting their capital stock and these costs are 
a convex function of the rate of change of the capital stock of the firm. This implies 
that it is costly for a firm to increase or decrease its capital stock, and that the 
marginal adjustment cost is increasing in the size of the adjustment. The irreversibility 
literature is traced back to Arrow (1968). He argues that: 
There will be many situations in which the sale of capital goods cannot be 
accomplished at the same price as their purchase…For simplicity, we will make 
the extreme assumption that resale of capital good is impossible, so that gross 
investment is constrained to be non- negative. 
Contrary to the costs-adjustment method, irreversibility predicts a concave 
marginal revenue product of capital. According to Leahy and Whited (1996) it makes 
returns to investment asymmetric:  
If the future returns out to be worse than expected, the marginal revenue 
product of capital falls and the investor is stuck with lower returns. If prospects 
improve, the incentive is to invest more, thereby limiting the rise in the marginal 
revenue product of capital. This asymmetry implies that the marginal revenue 
product of capital is a concave function of wages and prices. 
In the following pages these approaches are explained further. 
1.2.1- Traditional Finance 
Hahn (1947) argues that uncertainty represents disutility to the majority of 
people and will therefore only be incorporated in the price of capital. Thus, risk 
premium must be added to the market rate of interest or as risk discount must be 
  12 
subtracted from the expected yield. Modigliani and Miller (1958) define a class k of 
firms that have equivalent return such that “the return on the shares of any firm in any 
given class is proportional to (and perfectly correlated with) the return on the shares 
issued by any other firm in the same class”. Thus, all shares in a class have the same 
probability distribution of the ratio of the return to their expected return. In 
equilibrium in a perfect capital market the rate of price to monetary return must be 
same for all shares in class k. If this proportionality presents by (1/ρ), we must have  
j
k
j xp



1  
                          or            k
j
j
p
x


 
where pj denotes the price of a share, jx

 is the expected return per share of jth 
firm in class k. ρk is a constant of proportionality for all firms in class k and is 
interpreted as expected rate of return of any share in class k and by analogy with 
terminology for perpetual bonds, ρk can be considered as the market rate of 
capitalization for the expected value of uncertain streams for firms in class k. (1/ ρk) is 
the price which an investor has to pay for one monetary unit of expected return in the 
class k. With the assumption that firms cannot issue bonds and finance their activities 
with debts, the study shows that the expected rate of return, i, is 
j
j
kkj S
D
ri )(    
where r is the rate of interest, Dj denotes the market value of the debts of the 
company and Sj is the market value of its common shares. This equation implies that 
the expected yield of a share is equal to the appropriate capitalization rate ρk for a pure 
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equity stream in the class plus a premium related to financial risk measured by the 
debt to equity ratio multiplied by the difference between ρk and the rate of interest. 
This analysis has two difficulties: first as it has been mentioned earlier it does 
not consider dividend and so is a pure capital market analysis. Second, though the 
analysis is based on firm and industry level specifications the effect of uncertainty on 
the aggregate level of investment is unclear.  
1.2.2- Adjustment – Cost Approach 
 Hartman (1972,1973) emphasizes a positive relationship between uncertainty 
and investment under convexity of marginal adjustment cost and discrete-time 
specification of the price of output. The following assumptions are made: The firm is 
a price taker in the output and labor market but prices in each period are unknown 
until the beginning of that period. The firm is confronted with randomly varying, 
increasing marginal costs of investment in each period. This model of adjustment cost 
is appealing because it allows for the relative fixity of capital. The firm has a finite 
planning horizon, T. In any period t within the horizon, the firm produces output Qt, 
using capital Kt, and labor Lt, with the production function 
),( ttt LKFQ   
where this function is concave in capital and labor. The labor input is 
completely variable within each period. The investment in each period t does not 
affect the capital stock until period t+1. Depreciation is proportional to the capital 
stock and capital accumulation is generated by 
ttt IKK  )1(1   
The adjustment cost of the investment is given by ),( tt qIC  where qt is a 
random variable or vector that allows the function to shift between periods. It is 
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assumed that this function is increasing and strictly convex in I and q. Hence, 
whenever I is positive, there are increasing marginal costs to acquiring capital. 
Whenever I is negative ),( tt qIC  is negative and its absolute value gives revenues 
obtained from selling capital goods. In this case the strict convexity reflects the 
difficulties of selling large quantities of capital rapidly. The firm’s objective is to 
maximize the expected value of the sum of discounted cash flows: 



T
t
tttttt
t qICLWQPRE
0
)],([  
where R is a discount rate and the initial capital stock is fixed at K0. Under 
these circumstances, the study proves that the optimal investment does not decrease 
with increasing wage uncertainty. 
 Pindyck (1982) recalculates this relationship under different situations. 
Unlike other studies in which demand and cost are simply unknown at the time of 
decision-making their current extents are known and it is only their future amount 
which is uncertain. It is assumed that the market demand function shifts randomly but 
continuously over time according to a stochastic process. A dynamic model of the 
firm is assumed in which some factor inputs can be adjusted freely in response to 
stochastic demand changes, but other factors are quasi fixed in that adjustment costs 
are incurred when they are changed. The analysis is one of partial equilibrium and not 
general equilibrium. The study concludes that when demand shifts stochastically and 
continuously over time the level of desired capital and output will depend upon the 
curvature characteristics of the marginal adjustment costs. Uncertainty will increase 
the desired capital stock and output of a risk averse firm if its marginal adjustment 
costs are rising at an increasing or constant rate. Otherwise with a concave marginal 
adjustment costs, the effect of uncertainty on investment will be decreasing. The study 
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concludes that uncertainty over costs has the same effect as demand fluctuations. 
These results hold irrespective of whether the firm is in a competitive or monopolistic 
market and whether or not the firm holds inventories.  
Abel (1983) re-examines the uncertainty-investment relationship under 
Pindyck’s continuous stochastic specification in which the current prices are known. 
The author demonstrates that Hartman’s result continues to hold under Pindyck’s 
assumptions. In this study it is assumed that the firm is risk neutral and operates in a 
competitive market and has a convex cost of adjustment function. The firm uses labor 
Lt and capital Kt to produce output through a Cobb-Douglas production function. The 
wage rate is w and It denotes the gross investment made by incurring an increasing 
convex cost of adjustment C(It). Firm cash flow at time t is: 
  ttttt IwLKLp 
1  
where pt is price of output. The value of the firm will be calculated through the 
maximization of the summation of the present values of all future cash flows. The 
process of the maximization will yield a marginal cost of capital q which is inversely 
related to the variance. A summary of the study and related formulae has been 
presented in appendix A. Thus, for a given level of the current price of output pt, an 
increase in uncertainty, as captured by an increase in σ2, will increase It . Furthermore, 
the study shows that in the same way an increased uncertainty of real wage will 
increase investment and these results are independent of time. 
1.2.3- Irreversibility Approach 
Pindyck (1991) analyzes the uncertainty-investment relationship under the 
assumption of irreversibility. He demonstrates that under this assumption that 
increasing uncertainty will decrease the investment. Irreversibility of expenditures 
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means that costs are mostly sunk costs and cannot be recovered. Another assumption 
is that the investment can be delayed. This gives the firm a reason to wait for new 
information about costs, prices and other market conditions before it commits 
resources. An irreversible investment opportunity is much like a financial call option. 
When irreversible investment expenditure is incurred, the firm exercises or “kills” its 
option to invest. It eliminates the possibility of waiting for new information to arrive 
that might affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure. The loss of this option 
value is an opportunity cost that must be included in the total costs of investment. The 
value of the project must exceed the purchase and installation cost by an amount equal 
to the value of keeping the investment option alive. If V denotes the value of project, 
V changes due to a geometric Brownian motion3: 
VdzVdtdV        (4) 
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process such that: 
2
1
))(( dttdz   
where ε(t) is a serially uncorrelated and normally distributed random variable. 
We refer to  as the expected percentage rate of change of V with respect to time. 2  
is variance and  and  are constants4. With respect to the properties of the geometric 
Brownian motion model, equation (4) implies that current value of the project is 
known but future values are log-normally distributed with a variance that grows 
linearly with the time horizon. It is assumed that markets are sufficiently complete so 
that the individual decisions do not affect the opportunities available for other 
investors. Let x be the price of an asset or dynamic portfolio of assets perfectly 
correlated with V, and the correlation of V with the market portfolio be denoted by 
                                                
3 - For more information Ross (1999) might be studied. 
4 - For more information  appendix of Pindyck (1991) might be studied. 
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ρVm. Then x evolves according to xdzxdtdx    and by the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) its expected return is  mVr   where r is risk free rate of return 
and  denotes the market price of risk. We assume that δ denotes the difference 
between μ and α and it is interpreted as dividend by analogy with financial markets. 
Let F=F(V) be the value of the option to invest for a firm. The total return from 
holding the portfolio over a short time interval dt is dtVFdVFdF VV  . To avoid 
arbitrage possibilities it must be equal to dtVFFr V )(  . Then using Ito’s lemma we 
can calculate an expression for dF. 
Now we want a rule that maximizes the value of our investment opportunity 
F(V). Thus, we impose some assumptions and make some substitutions for simplicity 
(more details and further descriptions of the solving procedures have been presented 
in appendix A). Assuming that P is the price of output we find the value of the project 
V(P) which determines our valuation of the firm’s option to invest. This in turn 
determines the optimal investment rule. The optimal investment rule boils down to 
finding a critical P*, such that the firm invests only if P≥P*. The study finds out that 
for any given price P, an increase in σ causes the opportunity cost of investing in F(P) 
to increase more than the value of the project V(P). Thus, the critical price P* must 
increase with an increase in σ. Therefore, when uncertainty increases, firm will wait 
for a higher level of output price if *PP  . The project is a set of call options on 
future production. 
Thus greater the volatility of prices, the greater is the value of these options. 
Variability of output increases the critical price for investing, and reduces the net 
benefit of investment at every price. This means that greater uncertainty will increase 
the value of waiting (that acts as an opportunity cost for investment). Therefore, a 
higher price is needed to persuade the firm to invest.  
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In a similar way Pindyck (1992) extends his study over the effect of input cost 
uncertainty on investment in projects that take some time to build under 
irreversibility. This kind of uncertainty arises when the prices of labor, land and 
materials needed to build a project fluctuates unpredictably or when unpredictable 
changes in government regulations changes the required quantities of construction 
inputs. This study allows for the possibility of abandoning the project midstream, and 
maximizes the value of the firm in a competitive capital market. So, the decision rule 
is: Invest as long as the expected cost to complete the project is below a critical 
number. The investment opportunity under this condition can be considered as a put 
option in financial markets. The holder can sell an asset worth an uncertain amount 
for a fixed “exercise price”. As its value is increased by an increase in the variance of 
the price of the underlying asset (like options in capital markets), therefore 
uncertainty will increase the value of an investment opportunity. On the other hand, 
input cost uncertainty reduces the critical expected cost. It means that when costs of 
inputs become more uncertain, it results in a value of waiting for new information 
before committing resources. Hence, the increasing uncertainty will lead to an 
increase in the value of waiting. This, leads to a reduction in investment. 
Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) study the effect of investment lags in a model of 
uncertain and costly reversible investment. When the construction of a project lasts 
for some periods then it is possible that the set off price under uncertainty may be 
lower than the set off price under certainty5. According to their argument the intuition 
of the model of Pindyck (1991) is that a firm postpones its project in order to avoid 
facing low prices immediately after it has made an irreversible decision to enter. The 
opportunity cost of waiting is the certain income from the project that depends on the 
                                                
5 - Set off price in defined as a level of price that encourages and persuades investors to invest. 
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price during the delay. Since a firm can enter immediately, a short delay facilitates the 
avoidance of low returns which might be less than the opportunity cost of invested 
capital. The contrary result of the study of Bar-Ilan and Strange arises because authors 
suppose that between the decision to invest and the receipt of the first revenue of the 
project there exist a time lag. This assumption fundamentally changes the investment 
decision. Now a firm that waits cannot enter the market immediately after making a 
decision to invest. Thus, the opportunity cost of waiting does not depend on the price 
during the delay. Alternatively, it depends on the price in the future. Thus, the higher 
uncertainty about output price in the future will increase the opportunity cost of 
waiting as longer time lags increase the likelihood of higher prices. Therefore, with 
some lags in the investment project, the firm may hurry in order to catch the possible 
high prices that it might not be able to take advantage of if it is not in the market. 
Abel and Eberly (1995) have studied the impact of uncertainty on long-run 
investment. They argue that results obtained by Pindyck apply to a firm that starts 
with zero capital. But consequences for an ongoing firm could be different. When 
investment is irreversible, the optimal investment rule is to purchase capital to prevent 
the marginal revenue product of capital from rising above a hurdle. This hurdle, 
which is the user cost of capital appropriately defined to take account of irreversibility 
and uncertainty, is higher than Jorgenson’s user cost of capital which is computed 
under certainty and reversibility. This causes a newly starting firm to invest less under 
irreversibility as compare to reversibility. This result is called the "user-cost" effect. 
The consequence is that an increase in the variance of the shocks tends to increase the 
user-cost under irreversibility without affecting the user-cost in the standard reversible 
case. This increase in the user-cost due to increased uncertainty tends to further 
reduce the optimal capital stock under irreversibility. On the other hand, for an 
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ongoing firm, it will arrive at any future date with a capital stock representing the 
accumulation of capital prior to that date. If demand for firm’s output is unusually low 
at each time, the firm would like to sell some of its capital at a positive price. But 
under irreversibility it cannot do so and it would be constrained by its own past 
investment behavior which reflects the firm’s optimal response to favorable 
conditions in the past. This phenomenon is referred to as the “hangover” effect to 
indicate the dependence of the current capital stock on past behavior. The hangover 
effect can lead to a higher capital stock under irreversibility. The user-cost and 
hangover effect might have opposing implications for the current expectation of long-
run capital stock. The two effects react in opposing directions regarding the effect of 
increasing uncertainty on long-run investment. User-cost effect tends to reduce the 
capital stock under increasing uncertainty while hangover effect tends to keep the 
capital stock high under increasing uncertainty with irreversibility. The study points 
out that the effect of uncertainty on long-run investment for an ongoing firm is even 
more ambiguous than for a newly started firm. In the long-run there are cases in 
which the user-cost dominates and cases in which the hangover effect dominates. It is 
confirmed in this study that in the long-run increased uncertainty can increase 
investment under irreversibility, but it might increase investment even more under 
reversibility. Thus, whether the increase in the investment is higher under reversibility 
or irreversibility depends on the values and choice of parameters. 
Abel and Eberly (1996) deduce the effect of uncertainty on investment when 
capital is costly reversible. It is assumed that the firm can purchase capital at a 
constant price bU>0, and sell it at a constant price bL≤bU. This difference could be 
because of firm specific nature of capital or transaction costs. On basis of these two 
prices and by maximization of the expected present value of cash flows two separate 
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user costs of capital can be calculated. User cost cU is calculated for bU and user cost 
cL is calculated for bL. Then authors define a rule for investment: “keep the marginal 
revenue product of capital from leaving the closed interval [cL , cU ]”. When marginal 
revenue of product becomes higher than cU , firm starts to invest to bring it below the 
upper level of user cost. And when the marginal revenue of product falls below the cL 
, firm  start to disinvest to bring it above the lower level of user cost. With respect to 
the related calculations by authors, it is clear that increasing uncertainty widens the 
interval between cL and cU. Therefore, increasing uncertainty decreases investment.     
1.2.4- Covariance Approach 
Craine (1989) tries to examine the effect of risk on the allocation of capital in 
a simple general equilibrium model. There is a contradiction between the theories of 
the firm and conventional finance under uncertainty. Hartman and Abel as mentioned 
above argue that a mean preserving spread in the distribution of output price will 
increase demand for capital. But conventional financial asset pricing models suggest 
that an increase in the risk of an asset reduces the demand for that asset.  The theory 
of the firm and the theory of the finance are partial equilibrium analyses that make 
complementary assumptions about the relationship about the asset pay-offs and 
discount factor.  
In general equilibrium, the discount factor and pay-off to assets are 
independent endogenous variables. The uncertainties, which affect firm’s 
technologies and household preference, are exogenous. A mean preserving spread in 
the distribution of the exogenous states of nature makes the economy riskier. Through 
the maximization of lifetime utility, the technology’s risk is calculated as the 
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covariance between the riskless discount factor and the technology’s return factor6. 
And the expected return to capital in technology i is equal to the risk free rate adjusted 
for capital risk. This means that riskier technologies require a higher level of expected 
return in order to be commercially viable.  
Resources such as capital and labor, are the wealth of society. In each period 
aggregate capital is predetermined and aggregate labor is constant. Allocation of 
capital is based on the factor productivity of technology. Since capital is allocated 
before realization of the shocks. Output in each technology is calculated as a convex 
function of the productivity shock to that sector. Thus, expected output is an 
increasing function of the exogenous risk. But as aggregate output cannot be 
distributed independently of shocks to technology, the equilibrium allocation will 
depend on risk and expected returns as financial asset pricing models indicate. 
. The article concludes that a mean preserving spread in the distribution of the 
state of nature that affects firm’s technologies or household’s preferences has no 
effect on aggregate investment, but it alters the allocation of capital and labor among 
technologies. Therefore, the share of capital devoted to less risky technologies 
increases. 
1.2.5- Adjustment-Cost or Irreversibility? 
There are some studies that try to assess and justify the contradictions between 
results of adjustment-cost and irreversibility approaches. Caballero (1991) argues that 
the difference between two methods could be because of difference in assumptions 
about the possibility and cost of disinvestment.  
 
                                                
6 - Because it shows the relative susceptibility of the technology to volatility in the discount factor 
which is defined as the adverse ratio of the risk free rate. 
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Chart 1.2- Classification of adjustment-cost theories. 
But asymmetric adjustment cost is not sufficient to explain why the results are 
different. More important is that Hartman and Abel assume perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale, whereas Pindyck assumes either imperfect competition or 
decreasing returns to scale (or both). This paper highlights the role of the decreasing 
marginal returns to capital assumption (due to imperfect competition or decreasing 
returns to scale or both) in determining the effect of adjustment cost asymmetries on 
the sign of the response of investment to changes in uncertainty under the assumption 
of risk neutrality of investor. One of the findings is the lack of robustness of the 
negative relationship between investment and uncertainty under asymmetric 
adjustment costs to changes in the degree of competition. Asymmetric adjustment cost 
means that it is more expensive to adjust downward than upward. In the case of 
irreversible cost, adjustment costs are infinite for downward adjustment. As a matter 
of fact when firms are in a nearly competitive market the conclusion of Abel and 
Hartman holds no matter what the assumption about asymmetry is. Conclusive 
consequences about the sign of investment-uncertainty relationship should not be 
expected from the adjustment cost literature alone. The result confirms that Hartman 
and Abel conclusion is shown to be robust to asymmetries in the adjustment cost 
Adjustment-Cost 
Irreversible 
Reversible 
Asymmetric 
Symmetric 
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function, including the irreversible investment case. Hence investment and 
uncertainty are positively correlated even in the extreme circumstance of irreversible 
investment, as long as the firm confronts a very elastic demand curve (and returns to 
scale are non-decreasing). 
Abel and Eberly (1994) combine the two assumptions of irreversibility and 
existence of adjustment costs by assuming that the adjustment-cost function is strictly 
convex and has a value of zero at zero investment and it is infinite at any negative rate 
of investment. This means that they allow for cases in which the optimal rate of 
investment by the firm is never negative. The study introduces an augmented 
adjustment-cost function that considers traditional convex adjustment costs. 
Furthermore, it assumes the presence of fixed costs and allows for the possibility that 
the resale price of capital goods is below their purchase price and may even become 
zero. Through the maximization of the present value of the operating profits minus 
total investment costs, firm can calculate optimal investment. In this framework 
investment is a non-decreasing function of the shadow price q, which is always 
positive and is a non-decreasing function of variance. Thus, increase in uncertainty 
increases investment. 
1.2.6- Empirical Studies 
 Relative to theoretical studies, there is a more general consensus among 
empirical investigations about the negative relationship between uncertainty and 
private investment. Leahy and Whited (1996) ascertain the uncertainty-investment 
relationship through a panel of U.S. companies. They utilize a measure of uncertainty 
from the variance of asset returns. The study performs various sample splits in order 
to test comparative implications of the three mainstream theories (i.e. adjustment-cost, 
irreversibility and covariance base models). The main result is that uncertainty exerts 
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a strong negative impact on investment through its effect on q so that this impact has 
little relationship to risk as conventionally measured by the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). The comparison results are in favor of theories in which uncertainty directly 
affects investment rather than through covariance, and it is in favor of models in 
which the marginal revenue product of capital is concave. This leaves irreversibility 
models as the most likely explanation of the relationship between investment and 
uncertainty. However, Bo (1999) indicates that this negative effect could exist 
through channels other than q.  Koetse et al. (2006) argue that q models produce more 
negatively significant estimates than other models do through a Meta analysis.  
Nevertheless, Fuss and Vermeulen (2004) report that there is no evidence of 
an effect of price uncertainty on investment. Byrne and Davis (2005) find that the 
negative effect of uncertainty on investment is transitory in EU countries. 
Furthermore, Dehn (2000) indicates that positive ex-post commodity price shocks 
have strong positive effects on private investment in low developing countries. Darby 
et al. (1999) find a negative relation between exchange rate volatility and investment 
but “there are situations where that will happen, and situations where it will not”. 
The empirical studies are mostly confined to a few factors of uncertainty (e.g. 
Oshikoya, 1994; Serven , 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stasavage, 2000; Feng, 2001; or 
Edmiston, 2004), single-country studies (e.g. Federer, 1993; Cecchetti, 
1993;Zalewski, 1994; Reinikka, 1999; Darku, 2000; Gelb, 2001; Temple et al., 2001; 
or Carlsson, 2004; Gaskari and Ganbari and Eghbali, 2004), and also include some 
cross-country papers which do not deduct private investment from aggregate 
investment (e.g. Brunetti and Weder, 1998; Jeong,2002; or Asteriou and Price,2005). 
Focusing on private investment rather than overall investment is preferable when 
considering the effect of uncertainty, because Aizenman and Marion (1996) have 
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shown that in cases where high uncertainty leads to a decline in private investment, 
public investment often increases in compensation. 
Although the majority of studies do find a negative relationship between 
uncertainty and investment, on the whole, both approaches are not conclusive in their 
assessment of the impact of uncertainty on private investment. Typically, policy-
makers would want to know which sources of uncertainty are more significant for 
private investment. The current literature does not address this question adequately. 
This research provides an exhaustive empirical examination of the link between 
uncertainty and aggregate private investment using a large set of cross-country time-
series macroeconomic and institutions data for developing countries. The study makes 
an attempt at clearing the significance of all aspects of uncertainty as much as 
possible. 
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Chapter II 
A Review of Economy of Iran 
2.1- Economy of Iran 
In this study I will focus on the economy of Iran. Many factors make Iran ideal 
for a high degree of participation of the private sector in investment: a high 
percentage of young population that is educated (literacy rate of people in 15-24 age 
group is 94 %), rich natural resources, cheap energy, income from oil resources, and 
suitable geographical location. 
 
Year 
 
 
1974 
 
 
1980 
 
 
1990 
 
2000 
Total population 32173990 39124000 54400000 63664000 
Age between (15-64)% 51.19 51.75 51 61.5 
Literacy (15 and 
above)% 
40.5 49.67 63.16 76 
Literacy (15-24)% 63 73 86.32 94 
GDP Per capita $ 
(constant 2000) 
1785 1278 1196 1511 
Table 2.3- Comparison of socio-economical indices in Iran. 
As it is indicated in table-2.1, total population of Iran has doubled from 32 to 
63 million between 1974 and 2000. The age composition of population has changed 
with dependency ratio declining. The share of population in the 15-64 changed from 
51.19% in 1974 to 61.5% in 2000. The adult literacy rate (15 and above) has 
increased from 40.5% in 1974 to 76% in 2000. This literacy rate for youth (15-24 age 
group) has changed from 63% in 1974 to 94% in 2000. As it is indicated in figure-2.1 
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GDP per capita has fluctuated between U.S. $ 1000 and $ 2000 over this period. This 
figure indicates clearly that higher GDP per capita is associated with a higher rate of 
private investment. For many years the real interest rate has been negative, for 
example, it was -9.22, -25.23 and –11.49 in 1989, 1993 and 2000. The government 
has tried to protect private investment by financial incentives and import barriers, but 
private investment has hardly gone above 15 percent of GDP in the last two decades. 
The low rate of investment has had disappointing consequences for sustainable 
development and poverty alleviation (through its negative effect on job creation for a 
flood of young unemployed population)7.  
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Figure 2.1-GDP per capita of Iran from 1974 to 2000(U.S. $ constant prices of year 2000). 
 
Figure-2.2 represents the rate of private investment in Iran. It fluctuated 
heavily between 1973 and 1989. As I will show later these fluctuations had different 
causes. 
                                                
7 - Some news about capital flight has occasionally been released by media. 
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Figure 2.2- Private investment rate in Iran and India since 1971 to 2000. 
 
It reached a minimum level of 7.23% in 1974 and a maximum of 19% in 2000 
with an overall average of 11.5%. This rate has seen an upward trend since 1989 after 
the Iran-Iraq war. The rate of private investment in India has been shown for the sake 
of comparison (Figure 2.2). It varies less than that for Iran (the variance is 7.5 and 7.1 
percentage point for Iran and India respectively). It has an obvious upward trend from 
1973 to 1995 where it reaches the record high of almost 17%. However it shows a 
decline thereafter.  
For a better perception of the economy of Iran, the special nature of financial 
and monetary markets must be regarded. After the Islamic revolution in 1979 fixed 
interest was prohibited because of Islamic rules. Thus, firms could not be financed by 
selling bonds.  Furthermore, there was no advanced system of financial intermediation 
(e.g. venture capital). What remained were just a few big companies who could 
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supply their securities to the stock market, and plenty of entrepreneurs who either 
could enter into partnership or rush to the banks. 
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Figure 2.3- Fluctuations of inflation, nominal and real interest rates since 1988 to 2000 in Iran. 
 
Banking institutions in Iran lend funds at a rate called “bank commission for 
minimum expected profit” which is compatible with Islamic rules. This rate imposed 
by the Central Bank of Iran differs in different industries (e.g. agriculture, services, 
real state etc.) according to a fixed rate schedule which is administrated by the Central 
Bank. What I have considered in this study, as interest rate is a weighted average of 
these rates. The weights are given by the participation of each sector in the economy. 
Thus, my intuition is that banking funds must be a greater constraining factor with 
regard to private investment than interest rates in Iran. As real interest is often 
negative in Iran (Figure 2.5) a scarcity of funds would be a constraint on investment. 
Figure-2.3 indicates fluctuation of nominal and real interest rates and inflation. The 
nominal interest rate increased from almost 10% in the late 80’s to almost 20% in the 
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late 90’s. However, inflation fluctuated severely in this period and was of a high 
magnitude. The rate of 52.64% in 1993 was remarkable. Therefore, the real rate of 
interest turned negative in many years. Between1988 and 2000, only four years 
yielded positive rates of real interest. 
5
10
15
20
N
om
in
al
 in
te
re
st
 r
at
e
5
10
15
20
P
riv
at
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t r
at
e
1985 1990 1995 2000
year...
Private investment rate Nominal interest rate
 
Figure 2.4- Fluctuations of nominal interest rate and rate of private investment. 
Figures-2.4 to 2.6 show a comparison of the variations of inflation rate, 
nominal and real interest rate and the rate of private investment in Iran between 1988 
and 2000. In this period the rate of private investment increased despite the fact that 
the nominal rate of interest rose as well. The real rate of interest and the rate of private 
investment vary with different patterns. From 1988 to 1997 they are positively 
correlated whereas there is negative correlation after 1997. Except for periods in 
which the rate of inflation has gone beyond 40%, increasing inflation has been 
associated with higher private investment. 
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Figure 2.5- Comparison between fluctuations of real interest rate and rate of private investment 
in Iran. 
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Figure 2.6- Variation of Inflation and the rate of private investment in Iran. 
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We cannot review the economy of Iran without a look at the oil economy. Iran 
is one of the main oil producers in the world. It is a member of Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with an export of about two million barrels 
per day. 
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Figure 2.7- The price of crude oil ($ U.S.) and the rate of private investment (%GDP). 
 
A major portion of the country’s export revenue consists of incomes from the 
export of crude oil. It has hardly ever come below 80% of the total value of aggregate 
exports. Figure-2.7 presents the variations in the price of crude oil as well as the rate 
of private investment between 1971 and 2000. The prices of oil used are the spot 
prices of crude oil (Dollars per barrel) in West Texas Intermediate8. However, the real 
prices of oil exported out of Iran is quite below these prices though their movements 
are correlated with each other. Figure-2.7 shows that from 1971 to 1989 the prices of 
                                                
8 - Downloadable data is available in http://www.economagic.com . 
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oil and private investment rates were not correlated with each other. A decline in the 
private investment rate contemporaneous to the oil shock of 1974 and a small increase 
following a big fall in 1980 are worthy of mention. This shows that higher incomes 
corresponding to higher levels of oil prices not affect private investment 
contemporaneously. The indices have become more correlated after the war between 
Iran and Iraq. 
2.2- Uncertainties and Economy of Iran 
Diagrams pertaining to macroeconomic uncertainties are given in appendix B9. 
The uncertainty about trade in Figure-B5 and uncertainty about credit to private sector 
in Figure-B1 are continuously decreasing. Thus, such decreases cannot justify the 
fluctuations in the rate of private investment in the 70’s and 80’s. The uncertainty 
about exchange rate distortion, (Figure-B2) is also decreasing except for a structural 
break in 1994 and the uncertainty about inflation (in Figure-B7) cannot describe the 
fluctuations in the private investment rate as well. Contrary to the other uncertainties, 
uncertainties about real interest rate, (Figure-B4) and terms of trade, (Figure-B6), are 
continuously increasing. Therefore, this kind of homogeneous movement cannot 
justify the fluctuations of private investment in the 70’s and 80’s followed by an 
increase in the 90’s. The positively correlated increment in uncertainty about real 
interest rate and private investment is contrary to conventional wisdom. The 
contemporaneous effect of other factors (e.g. postwar era) might cover the negative 
effect of real interest rate uncertainty. Maybe, among the macroeconomic variables, 
uncertainty about growth is the best justification for variation of the rate of private 
investment. Uncertainty about growth shows a severe fluctuation in late 70’s and 
early 80’s and starts to reduce investment after the mid 80’s. 
                                                
9 - For more information about the definition and method of their calculation Chapter IV might be 
studied. 
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Diagrams of socio-political institutions have been presented in appendix B, too. 
Inequality (from Estimated Household Income Inequality Dataset, University of 
Texas) shows a U shape over time (as it is clear from Figure-B8) in Iran. If we ignore 
some increases in the period ranging from the early 80’s to mid 90’s then we can 
conclude that inequality and rate of private investment are positively correlated with 
each other in Iran. The index of democracy10 is graphed in Figure-B9. This index is 
almost constant except for some changes in the early 80’s in Iran. Therefore, it cannot 
reasonably justify fluctuations in private investment. The period of war has been 
graphed against the private investment rate in Figure-B10. It almost contains all time 
periods in the 80’s. The diagram shows that the peaks of private investment achieved 
in wartime are a little bit lower than those in other times. Furthermore, there are two 
nadirs in 1982 and 1987 with the rate of private investment falling below 8%.  
Figure-B11 shows a plot of the incidence of civil war against private investment 
rate. In the period between1978 and 1982 Iran was involved in different civil wars. In 
1978-1979 there was a conflict between the Central government and the Anti Shah 
coalition. In 1979-1980 and also in 1982 there was a conflict between the Central 
government and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran. In 1981-1982 there was a 
conflict between the Central government and Mujahedin e Khalq. Even though there 
were some minor and intermediate conflicts in other years those have been ignored. 
Other types of social unrest occurred around 1979: revolution, riots and strikes as they 
are indicated in Figures-B12, B15 and B16. However, there was no coup in Iran at all. 
There was a constitutional change (Figure-B13) in 1979. The largest number of 
assassinations in a year occurred in 1981. As Figure-B17 indicates, some purges 
occurred contemporaneously with nadirs in private investment rates in 1971, 1979 and 
                                                
10 - The definition of this index is given precisely in Chapter IV. 
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1986. Unfortunately, a considerable time series for the quality of indices of 
governance is not available with respect to Iran rendering it impossible to study its 
association with the private investment rate.  
To sum up, among the observable variables in Iran, we can see that uncertainty 
about growth, war and civil war, purges, constitutional changes, and a set of social 
unrests (i.e. revolution, riots strikes, assassinations) might explain decline and 
fluctuations in the rate of private investment11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 - As the number of observations is not enough for time series especially in case of governance in 
which three observations are available per variable, therefore a panel data method is applied 
for examination. 
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Chapter III 
Theory 
As it has been explained earlier, there are three schools dealing with the effect 
of uncertainty on economy and investment: traditional finance, neo-classics and post-
keynesians. Because the traditional finance and neo-classics are very close in terms of 
their definitions and attitudes toward uncertainty hence, I will unify them into one 
group (to be labeled as neo-classics now on) which will be compared with post-
Keynesians. According to the neo-classical point of view, price signals provide 
information about objective probabilities, and expectations can be shaped through 
analysis of probabilities determined from past data. It treats expectations as a 
determinant of gambling, and explains how we can evaluate it on the basis of a 
population parameter estimated by a probability determined from a sample. 
Estimation of the frequency distribution of the population can provide a 
reliable prediction about the future according to the neo-classical school, because the 
pattern of occurrence of events is assumed to be constant over time. We can then 
calculate the expected value of a random variable and use it to make rational 
investment decisions to maximize net wealth. In this method, probabilistic risk and 
uncertainty have been considered synonymous. With regard to this definition, 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) have calculated the market price associated with 
uncertain streams. Uncertainty is incorporated as a supplement to the certain interest 
rate in the form of a risk premium in order to determine the cost of capital. In order to 
maximize his wealth, a rational investor invests so that the marginal yield of his 
capital is equal to the risk adjusted cost of capital. In this analysis more uncertainty 
will lead to a higher risk premium and therefore higher cost of capital. Hence, 
investment will be decreases.  
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Keynes and post-Keynesians separate their approach from the neo-classical 
approach by a different definition of uncertainty. As Kregel (1998) argues: 
An obvious criticism is that the uncertainty faced in real life is unlike the 
uncertainty over outcomes of games of chance, because there is no possibility of 
random sampling with replacement. …if the underlying population is not 
constant, there is no possibility of forming a sample statistic based on expectation 
of the frequency distribution, irrespective of whether there is sampling with 
replacement at a given point in time and no expectation of the likely occurrence of 
specific realizations can be formed on the basis of standard statistical methods. 
Each event in time occurs due to a decision of an agent when he is confronted 
with what Kregel (1999) calls (quoting from Frank Knight) a ‘unique situation’. 
Furthermore, individuals might make a mistake either due to inadequacy of 
information or due to their limited computational ability to deal with a large number 
of possibilities. As, agents cannot optimize correctly, the scope and accuracy of their 
analyses is always restricted (Arestis, 1996). Arestis concludes that the past is 
immutable and the future is blurred and unknowable. Probability analysis is reliable 
when we have a statistical process in which the average calculated from the past 
events is not persistently different from the time average of future outcomes 
(Davidson, 1991). We can have this process when economic conditions are produced 
by natural laws. According to Kregel and Nasica (1999): 
If there are ‘natural’ or ‘objective’ laws producing current economic 
conditions, independently of agents’ expectations, then there will be objective 
probability distributions which can be estimated with increasing certainty by 
standard statistical procedures. But the real point of difficulty concerns the 
existence of the natural law, the specification of the objective process generating 
  39 
the results, which expectations would reflect, not with the process of predicting 
them. 
Because economic decisions are taken on the basis of human expectations, 
relevant variables might not be governed entirely by a natural law. Thus, we cannot 
shape future expectations purely on the basis of past observations. Thus, Davidson 
(1991) explains that objective probabilities and rational expectations may be adequate 
for estimation in some area of economic decision-making but they cannot be seen as 
constituting a general theory. Hence we can define an uncertain situation as a 
condition about which we do not know anything and it is distinctly different from a 
risky situation, which is characterized by a probability distribution over a few events. 
In this condition, rationality of the agent is expresses through the formulation of a 
probability distribution which is based on uncertain information and doubtful 
arguments, or the depiction of animal spirits (Kregel, 1987)12.  
Kregel (1987) expresses rationality on the lines suggested by Keynes by 
saying that rational agent responds to uncertainty through use of money as a store of 
value where the price of money is determined by the effect of uncertainty on liquidity 
preference. Davidson (1991) demonstrates that liquidity preference exists because of 
the social institution of money and law of civil contracts: in an uncertain world where 
liabilities are enforceable only in terms of money, entrepreneurs have to form sensible 
expectations about the certainty of future cash flows. Entrepreneurs limit their 
contracts and liabilities to what they believe their liquidity position can survive. They 
do not make any significant decisions involving real resource commitments until they 
are sure of their liquidity position, so that they can commit their responsibilities over 
time. The use of overlapping money contracts helps entrepreneurs to cope with 
                                                
12 - According to Farmer (2007) the term “animal spirits” is associated with John Maynard Keynes 
(1936) and captures the idea that aggregate economic activity might be driven in part by 
waves of optimism and pessimism. 
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uncertainties through a manipulation of their cash flow position over time. Therefore, 
they do not choose to have more of their resources, than what they need, in the form 
of fixed capital goods. They have to maintain their assets in the form of money, even 
though they know well enough that the future money value of their capital would be 
higher than its present money value (Kregel, 1988). Thus, the need is for liquid assets 
instead of assets in the form of fixed physical capital. Kregel (1983) explains that: 
Keynes represented the complex of expected rates of return on investment 
in capital assets by the marginal efficiency of capital [and] the expected returns 
on money by the liquidity premium. The rate of return on financial assets would, 
by definition, equal the liquidity premium; otherwise, agents would prefer to hold 
money. 
The idea of marginal efficiency of capital is based on the calculation of the 
return on an investment project like the yield at maturity of a fixed coupon bond. The 
efficiency of capital calculates the rate of discount that equates the purchase price of 
the investment to the present value of its expected future net receipts. But, Kregel 
(1999) criticized this method in some aspects: 
1. It assumed that reinvestment rate of interest is known and constant which 
means the risk of investment is constant over time. 
2. It fails to deal with the fact that bonds and investment projects differ in the 
certainty over the size and shape of the future net receipts. 
3. When there is variation in expected future flows or fluctuations in interest 
rates, there may be multiple internal rates of return. 
4. The final and most important reason is that difficulties surrounding the 
calculation of the present value of future flows from a project remain because 
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receipts from a bond coupons are perfectly known but the periodic net 
proceeds of an investment are not. 
Then Kregel (1999) demonstrates that the method of the user costs of capital might be 
a better idea for evaluation an investment project. The user cost often represents the 
difference between the current costs of producing relative to the maintenance costs of 
keeping them idle. But, this definition of user cost does not express the influence of 
the future on the present. Keynes tried to fix this problem. It is well known that the 
involvement of the entrepreneur in the process of production makes him pay money 
for the employment of factors. And usage of money includes interest rate in our 
calculation as the user cost of money. Thus, the production decision is a choice among 
options on the basis on their profitability.  
There is a profitable arbitrage trade in buying spot and selling forward where 
forward prices exceed spot prices by more than the carrying costs (Kregel, 1999)13. 
Ultimately the forward price will finally converge to the spot price plus the carrying 
costs (including interest rate). Thus, the spot and forward price structure brings into 
equilibrium the relative benefits for holding money and other types of wealth. Hence, 
the maximum profit in terms of money is a guide for the entrepreneur to select among 
alternative opportunities with regard to the spot and forward price structure as a 
whole. Thus, forward prices can be considered as present value of the net sum 
received per unit of output.  If the return from the current production and sales at the 
forward price is greater than the return gained from buying existing output at the 
prevailing spot price and holding it for sale at the expected price at a finite date then 
the agent decides to be involved in production. Decision about investment requires a 
precise calculation about his costs. This includes expenditures of fixed and variable 
                                                
13 - If merchandise is held to be sold in the future, this is involved in costs of storage, financing, 
insurance, transportation and so on. The carrying costs refers to this kind of costs. 
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factors plus the sacrifice, which he incurs by utilizing the equipment instead of 
leaving it idle. This sacrifice can be named as user cost. The user cost is thus the 
present value of the receipts that could have been earned if we delay selling the 
merchandise to a future date. Kregel acknowledges that there are two criticisms of this 
approach. The first criticism is about nonexistence of future markets and the second is 
the subjectiveness of expectations in this method.  
Kregel argues that usage of the option-pricing model can help to remedy these 
deficiencies. The option pricing theory allows the value of options to be fixed without 
the existence of real markets to set a price. Therefore, instead of adjusting the supply 
prices with user cost, it could be adjusted by showing the impact of future on the 
present through a proper index that calculates values of the embedded options. If a 
commodity is purchased today in order to sell in the future, interest costs will be 
incurred to finance the spot purchase. If expected future prices exceed current spot 
prices by more than the interest rate, there is a profit in buying spot and holding for 
forward sale. Hence, there is profitable arbitrage trade in buying spot and selling 
forward. This will ultimately bring the spot and forward prices into a relationship in 
which the market forward price is given by the current spot price and the carrying 
costs which is determined by the rate of interest and convenience yield. The 
calculation of present values requires the specification of future prices discounted at 
the rate of interest. Therefore, the future prices are given by the ratio of the spot prices 
plus the inclusive carry costs to unity plus the rate of interest. Thus, we do not need to 
formulate expectations about future prices as we have spot prices and the rate of 
interest. As is well known, standard deviation is needed to calculate the option values. 
This is the variable which is not presented in current prices and is unknown according 
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to the post-Keynesian approach. As Kregel accepts, the usage of volatility contradicts 
post-Keynesian methodology. 
According to Kregel and Nasica (1999) when an entrepreneur has to make a 
decision about an investment with long period flows, he falls back on his common 
sense as reflected in the actual observation of markets and business psychology rather 
than on the calculation of probabilities. The entrepreneur considers his past 
experience and may presume that status quo will continue, unless there is a reason to 
expect a change. There might be cases in which there is a lack of information and 
reliability of individual judgments. Here he relies on the judgment of the rest of the 
world (which he considers better informed) through what Keynes called as 
‘convention’.  
To sum up, there could be three environments in which the investment 
decision has to be made: certainty, risk and uncertainty. Under certain conditions 
Jorgenson’s method (1963) is adequate for determination of the optimal extent of 
investment. Investment is made till that the marginal value of product of capital is 
equated to the user cost of capital. In a risky environment, the probabilities of 
occurrence of a particular event are known. Thus, the values of risky streams are 
defined in terms of expected values of probabilistic receipts. There is a puzzle about 
the mechanism and sign of the effect of risk14 on investment in the neo-classical 
school as I mentioned in chapter one. However, according to the traditional finance, it 
must be added as risk premium to the discount rate. But, under uncertain 
circumstances that future is blurred. The post-Keynesian school tries to find an 
answer for investment behavior as has been discussed above. 
                                                
14 - According to the neo-classical school, risk and uncertainty means equivalently.  
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Apart from the fact that the main problem of prediction of future receipts has 
remained in post-Keynesian analysis (e.g. the existence of future market for all goods 
or contradiction in usage of the standard deviations for calculation of option prices), 
there is a problem in the interpretation of uncertainty when it is generalized as a 
unique and absolute phenomenon across the world. If we accept that behavior of 
individuals is unpredictable or there is a lack of information to the same extent all 
around the globe, then, we must expect that we observe a unique chaotic world in 
which there is no difference between U.S. and Zimbabwe. It seems the real world 
exists somewhere between two extreme of neo-classics and post-Keynesians.  
There are different sorts of beliefs, attitudes, cultures, laws and other 
institutions in countries, which determine the availability and reliability of 
information as well as its predictability. This difference in uncertainty is captured by 
the words of an Iranian saffron exporter interviewed by television in a trade fair in 
Spain: “ Here Spanish firms are giving their prices for five years. I am calling four 
times to Iran everyday and I hear that prices have changed each time. You will see 
that nobody will enter into a contract with us”.  
The quality of institutions in each country provides what Keynes (1936) 
describes as ‘ a considerable measure of continuity and stability in our affairs’ to 
make ‘the state of confidence’ on the basis of which we can trust our most probable 
forecasts. It seems we confront a quasi-predictable world in a sense that there is a time 
horizon within which entrepreneurs rely on their information and predictions to make 
decisions. What is beyond this time horizon is the unknown world of uncertainty that 
entrepreneurs do not want to step in. The length of the time horizon differs in each 
country depending on its institutions. The higher the uncertainty, the more 
unpredictable the future, and therefore, shorter the time horizon. This implies that 
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increasing uncertainty will lead to a riskier environment. However, the entrepreneur 
considers predictions to be valid only within a restricted period in this risky 
environment. 
But how can we calculate the time horizon? Suppose, )( ,  0  is the 
output price at time  and follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift parameter 
  and volatility parameter  . Let   denote a small increment of time. Assume that 
current price of output φ(0) is known. With the passage of   units of time the price of 
output either goes up by the factor u with probability P or goes down by the factor d 
with the probability 1-P. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 
 
As a property of the geometric Brownian motion model u, d and P are 
calculable and are equal to (see Ross, 1999): 
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However, I will explain later that we need not have any knowledge about 
probability distributions governing movements of prices in our analysis. The possible 
price movements are shown in figure-3.1. From the past we know how price has 
fluctuated over time. But given existing institutions (e.g. market forces, laws, etc.), 
the extent of these fluctuations has never gone beyond an upper and lower bound in a 
way such that L  where L is the difference between the two bounds. This 
condition is indicated in figure-3.2. 
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Figure 3.9 
 
We know that with current institutions, in each increment, price can shift with 
a limited movement up or down. If for simplicity we suppose that 1 , then price 
goes up to:  
     ett 1              (1) 
or comes down to: 
      ett 1             (2) 
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Lower bound 
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Now suppose a carmaker wants to design and produce a car, and he does not 
know where it will be driven. It can range from the highways of Germany to rough 
mountain roads around the Himalayas. This carmaker never considers an average of 
these probable roads for a proper design; instead, he tries to design a car, which can 
survive in the worst circumstances. In the same way an entrepreneur in an uncertain 
environment, follows a best worst strategy (he considers the worst movement of price 
and calculates whether under this trend, the project can survive or not) instead of 
making a mathematical expectation of all probable movements. Thus, he assumes for 
the purpose of designing the car the future price to decrease by an amount given by 
equation (2). These price movements under the worst case scenario are indicated in 
figure-3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 
 
Therefore, for instance, prices will attain  1 ,  2  and  3  at t=1, t=2 and  
t=3 respectively where  3  equals their lower bound. What will happen thereafter? 
Under this assumption the price is compatible with profitability for t 3 but not 
thereafter. With the existing institutions, in the past prices have never become lower 
than the lower bound for any given period. But there is no guarantee that for t >3 the 
Upper bound 
Lower bound 
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price will go up. We simply do not know what will happen next. This is the border 
between the world of risks and uncertainties.  
Consider a firm that produces one unit of merchandise in each period and 
there is no variable cost. BL denotes the lower bound to price. Critical period, t*, is 
determined as follows: 
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From (3) the critical period is decreasing in σ i.e. more unpredictability of the 
prices will lead to the reduction in the time horizon within which the entrepreneur can 
rely on his information and forecasts. The entrepreneur calculates the discounted 
payback period for his project as follows: 
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where r is the discount rate and is considered constant by assumption. If the payback 
period t calculated by equation (4) is greater than t*, then the project will be rejected. 
Projects with payback period equal to or less than t* will be candidates for acceptance.  
For instance, consider a project with φ(0) = 100, σ = 0.3 I0 = 244, r =0.06 and 
lower bound of price is BL = 30 and length of a period equal to a year.  Assume that 
there is no variable cost and one unit of output is produced each year. According to 
equation (3) we will have: 
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 Then, we should calculate the adjusted payback period for this project in the 
worst circumstance. With respect to equation (4) we can calculate t as follow: 
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As t< t*, the project will qualify as a candidate for acceptance. 
If variance decreases with time, which means we can have more precise 
predictions of the future (maybe because of an improvement in institutions) then, the 
line of price trends turn inside from 1 to 2 in figure-3.4. Because price will decrease 
more slowly than before it reaches its critical level the critical time period for any 
given project will be higher i.e. more investment can be incurred and more projects 
can be accepted. 
If variance increases with the time in a way that does not affect previous 
bounds, the line of price trends turns outside from 1 to 3 in figure-3.4, because prices 
decrease more rapidly than before. As the critical period occurs sooner (say t = 1 in 
figure-3.4), there will be a tendency to pick fewer projects – those with lower fixed 
costs and affording more liquidity (e.g. non producing businesses like those of 
intermediaries which sometimes need just a cell phone as fixed cost). Therefore, not 
only the quantity but also the quality of investment projects will change. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 
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Assume that fluctuations increase in a way that widen the gap between upper 
and lower bound (e.g. from L1 to L2 in figure-3.5). At first such fluctuations do not 
result in a revision of the variance significantly. Therefore, the entrepreneur initially 
increases his investment and accepts projects with a longer payback period (e.g. it 
changes from t = 2 to t = 4 in figure-5) because he thinks that his projects would have 
more time to survive.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 
But, when these fluctuations gradually continue they can increase variance and 
generate a wave of pessimism among entrepreneurs, reducing their confidence in their 
predictions. The line of price trends turns outside (e.g. from 1 to 2 in figure-3.5), 
reducing the critical period as well as investments. As figure-3.5 shows the critical 
point with lower and upper bound 1 is reached in t = 2. When the range shifts to L2 
then critical period increases to t = 4 implying that investment will increase. But the 
extent to which the critical period decreases after an increase in σ will depend on the 
changes in L and σ. It could be greater or smaller than the initial extent of decrease.  
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We can combine equations (3) and (4) with the interpretation that we will 
accept the projects in which future discounted cash flows are at least equal to the 
initial investment in the critical time period. From equation (4) we will have: 
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As we assume that quantity of output is 1 in each period, therefore 
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rate of investment at t and is denoted by ir hereafter. Solving the integral for τ will 
yield: 
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Aggregating continuously over N individuals in each period of time, from 
equation (4) we will have: 
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For simplicity we eliminate r. 
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is the value of current output deflated by 
the lowest level of prices in the past. I denote it by yit and it can be supposed, for 
simplicity that yit , risks and level of price at time t are equal for different individuals 
in different sectors so that σi = σ ,  yi = y and φi(t) = φ(t). Therefore, the time horizon 
for each individual and for the entire economy can be assumed to be a unique value t* 
15. Thus, from equation (7) we have:  
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15 - This means that T* = t* . 
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The left hand side of equation (9) is the smallest ratio of aggregate investment 
to aggregate current product and is denoted by IR . Thus, we have  
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Equation (10) is very similar to equation (6) except that the cost of capital is 
eliminated. Substituting equation (3) in (10) will yield 
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as mentioned above. The rate of investment is a function of σ and yit. 
It implies that higher levels of output price will increase the investment rate whereas 
increasing uncertainty decreases the investment rate. 
It can be shown that IR is non-increasing in σ for σ>0. From equation (11) we have 
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As 1ity  , (12) is non-positive. 
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Figure 3.13 
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Figure 3.14 
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 Figure-3.6 shows the changes in IR that accompany changes in σ for y=4. 
Note that IR cannot become greater than one because we cannot invest more than our 
income and it is a nonnegative amount. As is clear in figure-3.6 the investment rate is 
decreasing in σ. Figure-3.7 indicates that a higher y due to a higher level of current 
price or reduction in lower bound (BL) will increases the rate of investment at any 
given level of uncertainty.  
In conclusion, with the existing institutions in a country there would be a time 
horizon within which investors could rely on their information and predictions. This 
time horizon could be different from one country to another depending on institutions 
and institutional changes over time. Increasing uncertainty will reduce this time 
horizon. This means that investors will expect that current price might reach the lower 
bound sooner. Hence, not only will investment decrease but it will also be biased 
toward the more liquid projects in composition. 
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Chapter IV 
Methodology, Estimation and Analysis 
4.1- Data And Data Preparation Process 
As datasets are prepared for different purposes therefore, they are often similar 
neither in spatial coverage nor in the time period covered. Also, there are some 
indices that are used by commercial agencies and they are not popularly available. 
Therefore, I have collected a set of available indices that cover a wide range of 
countries over a long period of time. 
In this research the various types of uncertainty pertain to three different 
categories: changes in policies and macroeconomic outcomes (between 1971-2000), 
the quality of public governance (in 1996, 1998 and 2000) and socio- political 
institutions and conflicts (from 1970 to 1993).  
a) Under “Changes in policies and macroeconomic outcomes” we deal with 
unpredictability in the following factors: GDP growth, trade, inflation, 
domestic credit to private sector, real interest rate, distortion in exchange 
rates and terms of trade. 
b) Under “Socio-political institutions and conflicts” we measure uncertainty 
by the incidence of assassinations, strikes, purges, riots, revolutions, 
wars, civil wars, coups, variables that capture the extent of democracy, 
constitutional changes and inequality. 
c) Under “quality of public governance” we include government 
participation in the economy, control of corruption, regulatory burden, 
property rights and rule of law. It is assumed that better quality of 
governance is associated with lower uncertainty. 
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The sources of the variables and their definitions have been explained as 
follows: Private investment rate is defined as the ratio of private investment to GDP. 
Data on private investment rate have been retrieved from Everhart & Sumlinski 
(2001). Private investment is defined as the difference between total gross domestic 
investment (from national accounts) and consolidated public investment (from 
different sources). 
Government Participation in Economy is measured by The Heritage 
Foundation as an index of government intervention. This factor measures 
government’s direct use of scarce resources for its own purposes and government’s 
control over resources through ownership. The measure covers both government 
consumption and government production. The scale runs from 1 to 5. A score of 1 
signifies an economic environment or set of policies that are most conducive to 
economic freedom (lowest government intervention), while a score of 5 signifies a set 
of policies that are least conducive to economic freedom (higher government 
intervention). 
The index of Property Rights has been used by The Heritage Foundation and 
scored from 1 to 5 where 1 means the best condition and 5 the worst. Beach & Miles 
(2006) describe their methodology as the following: 
This factor scores the degree to which a country’s laws protect private 
property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It 
also assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and 
analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within 
the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce 
contracts. The less certain the legal protection of property, the higher a 
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country’s score; similarly, the greater the chances of government 
expropriation of property, the higher a country’s score. 
The next three variables are collected from Kaufmann et al. (2005), World 
Bank. This data source consists of surveys of firms and individuals as well as the 
assessment of commercial risk rating agencies, non-governmental organizations, and 
a number of multilateral aid agencies. These indices are normally distributed with a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. This implies that 
virtually all scores lie between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to 
better outcomes. I use the following variables from this collection: 
Regulatory Burden measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies. Rule 
of Law measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Control of Corruption measures the 
exercise of public power for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption 
and state capture. 
Easterly (2001) has presented a unique collection of social, political and 
economic characteristics of countries: Assassinations is the number of politically 
motivated murders or attempted murders of a high central government official or 
politician. Strikes is the number of any strike of 1,000 or more by industrial or service 
workers (per ten million population). Purges is the number of systematic eliminations 
by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the 
opposition (per ten million population). Riots is defined as the number of violent 
demonstration or clashes of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force 
(per ten million population). Revolutions is the number of any illegal or forced change 
in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or 
unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central 
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government. Coups is defined as the number of extra constitutional or forced changes 
in the top government elite and/or its effective control of the nation’s power structure 
in a given year.  Unsuccessful coups are not counted. Constitutional Changes is the 
number of basic alterations in a state’s constitutional structure, the extreme case being 
the adoption of a new constitution that significantly alter the prerogatives of the 
various branches of government.  Examples of the latter might be the sub-situation of 
presidential for parliamentary government or the replacement of monarchical by 
republican rule.  Constitutional amendments, which do not have significant impact on 
the political system, are not counted. 
Index of Democracy is another variable that I use. I collect it from Polity IV 
project by Marshall & Jaggers (2002). The Polity IV project continues the Polity 
research tradition of coding the authority characteristics of states in the world system 
for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis. Their methodology considers 
democracy (DEMOC) as consisting of three essential, interdependent elements: 
One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which 
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and 
leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise 
of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all 
citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. 
Other aspects of plural democracy (e.g. the rule of law, systems of checks and 
balances, freedom of the press, and so on) are means to, or specific manifestations of, 
these general principles. Authors also have calculated an index for autocracy 
(AUTOC). They at first define “Authoritarian regimes” as political systems whose 
common properties are a lack of regularized political competition and concern for 
political freedoms. Then they use the more neutral term “Autocracy” and define it 
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operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In 
mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political 
participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection 
within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional 
constraints. The POLITY score is computed by subtracting AUTOC from DEMOC. 
The resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to –10 
(strongly autocratic). 
Wars and Civil Wars are two other indices, which I employ as the sources of 
uncertainty. I collect them from two sources: the first is Correlates of War (COW) 
project 1816 – 1997(V.3) that was offered by Serkees (2000), and the second prepared 
by Gleditsch (2004), which is a revised version of COW covering the period 1816 - 
2002. The author explains that the article displays a revised list of wars since 1816, 
with updates for 1997 to 2002 based on data compiled by the Department of Peace 
and Conflict Research at Uppsala University.  
Inequality is another variable that I employ in this article. I have utilized 
Estimated Household Income Inequality Dataset (EHII). This dataset is offered by 
University of Texas – U.S. and as they state on their website, this is a global dataset, 
derived from the econometric relationship between UTIP-UNIDO16, other 
conditioning variables, and the World Bank’s Deininger & Squire data set. 
The following seven macroeconomic variables are gathered from World Bank 
Development Indicators 2005. It consists of terms of trade, inflation, GDP growth, 
real interest rate, trade, exchange rate distortion and domestic credit to private sector. 
These variables are defined as follows: 
                                                
16 -UTIP- UNIDO is a global data set that calculates the industrial pay-inequality measures for 156 
countries from 1963-1999. This is a joint project by University of Texas Inequality Project 
(UTIP) and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). 
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Terms of Trade are the ratio of the export price index to the corresponding 
import price index measured relative to the base year 2000 (year 2000 = 100). Real 
Interest Rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP 
deflator (percent). Inflation is measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit 
deflator. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to 
GDP in constant local currency (annual percent). Growth of GDP is the annual 
percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices expressed in constant local currency. 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product (percent of GDP). Domestic Credit to Investment refers to 
financial resources provided to the private sector, such as loans, purchases of non-
equity securities, and credits that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries 
these claims include credit to public enterprises (percent of GDP). The last variable is 
Volatility of Distortion in Exchange Rate. Dollar (1992) constructs this index to 
measure outward orientation in real exchange rate policies. As he urges, outward 
orientation generally means a combination of two factors: first the level of protection, 
specially for inputs into the production process, is relatively low, and second, there is 
relatively little variability in the real exchange rate, so that incentives are consistent 
over time. Brunetti & Weder (1997) have used this index as a proxy of policy 
uncertainty to analyze its effect on investment. The measure of the real exchange rate 
is distorted by the existence of non-tradables. Therefore, Dollar tries to correct this as 
following: 
At first, he uses the International comparisons of price levels compiled by 
Summers and Heston (2002). They price the same basket of consumption goods in 
domestic currency in different countries and then convert the measure into U.S. 
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dollars, using the official exchange rate. Using the U.S. as the benchmark country, the 
index of country i’s relative price level (PRL) is 
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where Pi is the price of the consumption basket in country i in U.S. dollars. Then, 
Dollar regresses PRLi on dummies for years and continents (the outliers detected by 
Hadi (1992, 1994) have been excluded from the estimation). This is done to correct 
for differences in factor endowment, which in turn serves as a proxy for differences in 
price of non-tradables. He uses the regression to calculate the predicted relative price 
level for each year and each country. The actual price level divided by this predicted 
price level (based on data from previous periods) is the index of real exchange rate 
distortion.  
Unpredictability of these variables is considered as a source of uncertainty. I have 
calculated their unpredictability as variance of the residuals generated by the best 
fitted moving average (MA) process17 conditional on information till the last period: 
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Where,  ,
2
xe
 is the conditional variance of variable x for the first   periods and ex,t-1 
is the residual of x in a MA process in period t-1. I used a MA process because it 
gives an estimation based on information and experiences of the previous periods. 
Therefore, conditional variance of its residuals is a measure of unpredictability in 
behavior of x. The list of these MA processes is provided in table-C1, appendix C. 
The lists of all the variables and their properties are presented in table-C2 and table-
C3 respectively. 
                                                
17 - Mostly the best fit was available by MA(3) but in some cases I had to use the other orders like one, 
two  or four.  
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4.2- Methodology 
I applied a panel method even though my study is about Iran. It is because of 
two reasons: first, shortage of data in some variables like rule of law, control of 
corruption and property rights, makes it impossible to utilize time series methods. 
Second, there are some factors, which hardly change over time - for example property 
rights or level of democracy. So, the analysis of these factors in a time series process 
is almost impossible. The methodology of panel data gives us the opportunity to take 
these factors into account in our analyses.  
As Beck and Katz (1996) and Beck (2001) have mentioned, a panel data 
model yields generalizable results if the sample is collected through a random 
sampling scheme but yields sample specific results if a random sampling scheme is 
not used. I have collected data on 39 countries including Iran. The choice is dictated 
by availability of data and is not done through a random sampling. The list of 
countries is presented in table-C7 of appendix C. All inferences of the panel are valid 
only for the countries included in the panel. We can expand our inferences from this 
estimation to cover future periods for included countries but we cannot use them to 
generalize about other countries. 
There are three incomplete panels as mentioned above: panel dealing changes 
in policies and macroeconomic outcomes for the period 1971 - 2000 with an average 
of 23 observations per country. b) Panel dealing with socio-political institutions and 
conflicts for the period 1970 - 1993 with an average of 18 observations per country 
and c) finally a panel dealing with the quality of public governance and covering three 
years 1996, 1998 and 2000. 
The fixed effects model is used if we think that there are intrinsic differences 
among units. The random effects model is used if the differences among units are not 
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intrinsic to the units. Differences that are not accounted for by explanatory variables 
are random and restricted to the sample period alone. Hsiao (1986) and Beck (2004) 
argue that fixed effects are proper if one collected units without any sampling scheme, 
whereas the random effects model is suitable if one has a random sample from a 
larger population and wants to make inference about that larger population. Thus, the 
fixed effects are more suitable for my study than random effects, though, the 
Hausman specification test can be used as a diagnostic tool for distinction between 
fixed and random effects. I treated first and second panel as TSCS18 data with its 
different cross sectional and times series issues19, and third panel is thought as a fixed 
effect panel data because of the small number of observations per unit. I proceed as 
follow:   
In the next section I will discuss the problems, challenges and results, which 
typically exist in TSCS data in the first panel. Then, the strategies and results about 
the second panel (socio- political institutions and conflicts) have been discussed. After 
that I will discuss the related issues in third panel, its specific problems and the results 
of the model. 
4.3- Uncertainty About Macroeconomic Variables 
4.3.1- Unit Root Test 
I utilized the Maddala and Wu (1999) test to check for stationarity. The full 
details of test have expounded in table-C8, appendix C. There is evidence that 
supports rejection of the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. None of the variables in 
this panel has a unit root. Hence, we can proceed without any concern about spurious 
regression.  
                                                
18 - Time series- cross section data is a panel data with relatively more observations- say more than 10- 
per unit. 
19 - Therefore some tests for detection of heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation is needed.  
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4.3.2- Poolability 
The concept of poolability is concerned with the coefficients of variables for 
each country. It simply implies that the effect of a given explanatory variable is 
constant across the countries. The core question is that whether all countries have the 
same function for the data generation process or whether each country has its own 
function for the generation of data. If we assume that each variable is homogenous 
across countries then our model will be: 
ititit XY                (1) 
where Yit is the value of dependent variable for country i in the period t. Xit is the 
vector of independent variables, β vector of coefficients that are common among the 
countries and εit is error term for country i in the period t. However, if the coefficients 
of exogenous variables vary from one country to the other, then we can write: 
itiitit XY                  (2) 
where βi is the unit specific coefficient. We often like to pool the data to use its 
advantages: it increases the efficiency of the estimates (Stanig, 2005), this model 
allows for the analysis of variables that vary only a little over periods or over units 
(Franzese and Hays, 2005). The number of observations as well as degrees of freedom 
increases (Plumper, Troeger and Manow, 2005). On the other hand, as Stanig (2005) 
shows if the functional relation among variables in the data generating process is not 
constant across units but the data is pooled, we will have specification error in our 
estimation. 
There is a traditional F-test for the detection of heterogeneity in the data 
generation process. Referring to equation 1 and 2 the null hypothesis is  
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F test compares the difference in sum of squares residuals from the two equations 
mentioned above, divided by the proper number of degrees of freedom and mean 
square error of equation 2:  
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where ii ee
  is the sum of square of errors (SSE) of the OLS regression for group i . 
ee is the SSE of the pooled OLS regression. N is the number of units. K denotes the 
number of variables including the intercept and excluding dummy variables. The 
number of time periods is denoted by T. But this test is not used because as Beck 
(2001) argues this test often tends to reject the null of pooling because of the some 
reasons; there might be a slight variation in all βi, at least one country is not fit well by 
equation 1, or there is some parameter variation because of the large sample size 
common in TSCS data sets. And later he demonstrates that poolability is preferable if 
number of the periods covered is less than 30 so that the gain from an increase in 
observations generated by poolability outweighs structural differences between 
countries (Beck, 2006). Baltagi (2005) lists a battery of investigations through which 
he concludes that homogeneous estimators outperform heterogeneous one. And Beck 
& Katz (2004) summarize that: “… The gains from pooling offset the costs of pooling, 
more than standard statistical theory asserts”. Therefore, I assume that slopes are 
same across the countries and over time.   
  66 
4.3.3- Outliers 
In this section I try to find out whether there is any country in the panel, which 
might act as an outlier and therefore needs to be excluded from our estimation. There 
are two methods for this detection (Beck, 2006). The first is a Box plot of dependent 
variable and the second is cross validation.  The first method is simple. Its result has 
been shown in figure-B19, appendix B. As the figure demonstrates private investment 
of Bulgaria fluctuates in a pattern totally different from that of the other countries and 
must be excluded from the panel.  
Cross validation needs further calculations. According to Beck (2001) the 
simplest form of cross validation is to leave out one country, fit an OLS regression 
with all other countries, and predict the left out country. Then, we can compare the 
mean square error of predictions. I have done it using all variables except real interest 
rate, because the number of observations for real interest rate is considerably lower 
than those for other variables. The result has been shown in table-C9, appendix C. 
Again, Bulgaria with mean square error of about 2.199 stands out as an outlier. 
Hence, we exclude it from our estimation and pool the other countries with each 
other. 
4.3.4- Fixed Effects 
I discussed earlier that fixed effects are proper when we collect our units 
without any random sampling scheme. Next in the discussion about poolability I have 
argued that it is better if the data are pooled. This section is dedicated to finding out 
whether we should have one intercept as in a completely pooled model for all 
countries or let each country have its own intercept. The application or elimination of 
fixed effects has its own risks and advantages. If we employ fixed effects, according 
to Beck (2001) and Baum (2006) we have to exclude time-invariant variables of the 
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model due to their co linearity, because, the demeaning process will eliminate them 
for all time periods20. Moreover, fixed effects will “ soak up” most of the explanatory 
power of the variables which vary slowly over time. On the other hand, however we 
can fix these problems with elimination of the fixed effects and control the effects of 
exogenous shocks common to all countries. However, as Wilson & Butler (2004) 
precisely demonstrate, ignoring the fixed effects can lead us to a biased estimation 
due to omitted variable bias. This bias may even change the sign of coefficients. This 
is what they have to say about low-moving variables: “We definitely agree that unit 
effects soak up the explanatory power of sluggish variables, but in our view this- to 
the extent that following conservative norms of inference is desirable- is a good thing, 
not a cost”.  
We can test if the model needs fixed effects or not. The null hypothesis is 
0... 110  nH   
Due to Park (2005) & Greene (2003) this hypothesis is tested by a traditional F test 
that is based on loss of goodness of fit  
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Where robust (unrestricted) model is Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) and 
efficient (restricted) model is the pooled regression. Subscription U denotes 
‘Unrestricted’ to a variable and subscription R denotes ‘Restricted’ to a variable. n is 
the number of countries, k is the number of the regressors excluding dummy 
variables, and nT  is the number of total observations. I left Bulgaria out of the 
                                                
20 - Demeaning process is the subtraction of a variable from its average, which is  xx  . Including a 
time invariant variable in a fixed effects model causes its value to be zero for all time periods. 
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equation. The F calculated for the panel 36.02 [37, 848] 21rejects the null hypothesis 
of pooling at the 0.01 significant level.  
 
4.3.5- Estimator Selection Strategy 
If equation 1 is the model, in the process of selection of an estimator for our 
model then we must take into account the Gauss-Markov assumptions. If the error 
process meets the assumptions, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is optimal. The Gauss-
Markov assumption explains that each unit error term εit must be independent and 
identically distributed: 
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If errors do not satisfy this assumption, OLS will be inefficient and estimated standard 
errors may be incorrect. This assumption may be violated because of 
a)Heteroskedasticity b) contemporaneous correlation and c) serial correlation. Later, 
these problems will be discussed in greater detail.  
One strategy to deal with these problems is estimation by feasible generalized 
least square (FGLS) as suggested by Park (1967) and popularized later by Kmenta 
(1986). This method as criticized by Beck & Katz (1995, 96) as it produces standard 
errors that lead to extreme overconfidence. They report that calculated standard errors 
understate variability by about 100 percent if the number of observations is less than 
30 and by almost 30 percent for more observations. Hence, we should always be wary 
of downward bias in standard errors and upward bias in t statistics in small samples. 
Furthermore, this method for contemporaneous correlated errors cannot be applied 
unless the number of observations becomes as big as the number of countries. Even in 
                                                
21 - The numbers in brackets are the degree of freedom. 
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this circumstance estimation of standard errors is problematic unless the number of 
observations per country is considerably larger than the number of countries. 
An alternative strategy for TSCS data is OLS with Panel Corrected Standard 
Errors (PCSE) suggested by Beck & Katz (1995, a). They have demonstrated by 
Monte Carlo experiments that this strategy has better performance in the presence of 
either panel heteroskedasticity or contemporaneous correlation. Monte Carlo 
experiments have shown that PCSEs are very close to OLS standard errors when the 
Gauss Markov assumptions hold. Chen, Lin & Reed (2005) also reported that PCSE is 
superior to FGLS when one’s main goal is hypothesis testing. However, one must be 
cautious about the number of observation per units. As Beck (2001) argues: 
Theoretically, all asymptotics for TSCS data are in T; the number of 
units is fixed and even an asymptotic argument must be based on the N 
observed units. We can, however, contemplate what might happen as T tends 
to infinity, and methods can be theoretically justified based on their Large T 
behavior. 
So, researchers ought to be wary of TSCS methods applied for less than 10 
observations per unit. Thus, we can use this method for estimating the first and second 
panel, but it will not be proper for the third one with just three observations per 
country. In the following sections the violation of Gauss-Markov assumptions will be 
detected. 
Heteroskedasticity 
One of the assumptions which lead to optimality of the OLS process is the 
homoskedasticity of the error terms i.e. error terms have the same variance across all 
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countries. This assumption might not hold for empirical data. For instance, the level 
of the inflation in one country might be more volatile than that in the other country. 
Any assumption that error terms have the same variance across countries, must 
be checked by a test for the existence of this problem. I applied a modified Wald 
statistic for country-wise heteroskedasticity to the residuals of a fixed effect 
regression model, following Greene (2000). First, the fixed effect model is estimated 
under the assumption of homoskedasticity. The null hypothesis is that  
  iH 20       , i=1,...,g 
where g is the number of cross-sectional units. The test statistic is distributed as a Chi-
squared statistic of order g. Bulgaria is left out of the equation again. Because, real 
interest rate has a lot of missing values the test is performed twice, once with real 
interest rate included as a variable and once without it. When real interest rate 
included as a variable in the test the Chi squared statistic calculated for the panel is 
5.6*1030, which causes us to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at the 0.01 
significant level. When real interest rate is excluded, the Chi squared statistic is 
1858.63 and therefore we reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at the 0.01 
level again.   
Contemporaneous correlation 
Another cause for violation of the Gauss-Markov assumptions is 
contemporaneous correlation, which is observed if unobserved features of one country 
relate to unobserved features in other countries (Beck, 2001). Hence we can see 
contemporaneous correlation where there is a strong economic linkage between 
countries (e.g. European Union). Following Greene (2000), the Breusch-Pagan test, 
when applied to the residuals of the fixed effect regression under the null hypothesis 
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of cross sectional independence, can detect contemporaneous correlation. The 
resulting test statistic is distributed as Chi squared with d degrees of freedom where 
d=g*(g-1)/2 and g is the number of countries. Unfortunately, this test fails to calculate 
any test statistics because its correlation matrix of residuals becomes singular. 
Therefore, no evidence can be gathered to test contemporaneous correlation. The 
solution adopted is to estimate the equation twice, once assuming contemporaneous 
correlation and once without. As we will see later the results are almost similar 
together.  
Serial correlation 
There are vast arguments about the methods to deal with this problem. 
According to Baltagi (2005), ignoring serial correlation when it exists, lead us to a 
consistent but inefficient estimate of the regression coefficients and biased standard 
errors. Wooldridge (2002) suggested a test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic 
errors of a linear panel-data model. Drukker(2003) demonstrates that this test has 
good size and power properties in reasonable sample sizes. Under the null hypothesis 
of no auto-correlation the residuals from the regression of the first-differenced 
variables should have an autocorrelation of -0.5.  This implies that the coefficient on 
the lagged residuals in a regression of the lagged residuals on the current residuals 
should be -0.5.  The Wooldridge test’s F-statistic that has been calculated in this case 
is 6.998 [1, 37] and we therefore reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the 
0.05 significant level. That means we should adjust for serial correlation in the model.   
Dealing With Serial Correlation 
As I mentioned already, there is a vast debate about the proper methods dealing with 
the serial correlation in TSCS data. One strategy is the AR(1) process: 
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I first estimate (3) by OLS. From (3) the residuals are used to estimate ρ for 
the second equation. In the next step, observations are transformed by the Prais-
Winsten transformation to produce serially independent errors. Kmenta (1986) 
suggests unit specific ρ. Beck & Katz (1995, b) argue that if it is accepted that the 
coefficients of parameters of interest do not vary in the pooling process, then there is 
no reason for serial correlation parameters to vary by units. They showed by Monte 
Carlo experiments that the assumption of a common serial correlation process leads to 
superior estimates of β even when the data are generated with unit specific ρi . This is 
because ρi is estimated using only a small number of observations per country and it is 
well known that auto regressions estimated from less than 30 observations lead to 
unreliable results.  
They alternatively suggest a lagged dependent variable (LDV) method 
instead: 
tititiiti XYY ,,1,,              (5) 
One problem of this method is that both the lagged dependent variable and one 
of the explanatory variables might be correlated. Moreover, Plumper, Troeger & 
Manow (2005) argued that the LDV method might absorb large parts of the trend 
without actually explaining whether the dependent variable exhibits a general time 
trend. Under this condition, estimates can be biased if at least one variable has a 
persistent effect. If we do not consider this persistence and do not model it, the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is biased upwards, while the coefficient 
of the other independent variables are likely to be biased downwards. They then argue 
that the AR (1) model tends to absorb less time series dynamics and could be superior. 
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However, the least harmful specification of the estimation model depends on the 
theory of the researcher. Wilson & Butler (2004) claim that apart from AR (1) and 
LDV, other dynamic methods, which one can think of are the distributed lag (DL) 
model and the auto regressive distributed lag (ARDL) model. They emphasized that 
LDV will cause the fixed effects model to be biased, but the bias is relatively small 
for the independent variables, though a substantial bias can exist for the LDV 
coefficient. Beck & Katz (2004), with the acceptance of this fact, claimed that the 
coefficient of the dependent variable in LDV must not be interpreted casually. On the 
other hand, they added that ARDL is also too general and because of multicollinearity 
this generality is harmful. 
As far as the theory of investment under uncertainty is concerned, uncertainty 
can arise from the “value of waiting”. Investors might delay decision making to get 
more information and higher rates of return (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994) and (Novy-
Marx, 2007). Therefore, there is uncertainty about exactly when an investor will 
invest. As soon as the cost of waiting exceeds the expected rate of return, the investor 
would abandon the investment or may even exit the industry. On the other hand, 
Uncertainty in period t is a function of uncertainty in period t-1 because they share a 
common information basing ranging from period 0 to period t-2. Hence, I select an 
AR(1) model to fix the problem of serial correlation. 
4.3.6- Multicollinearity 
Numerous dummy variables as well as a conceptual relationship among the 
independent variables causes us to be suspicious about multicollinearity. For instance, 
a revolution could be accompanied by riots and strikes or a better rule of law which 
can lead to lower corruption. Even severe multicolinearity does not violate OLS 
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assumptions and its estimate is still unbiased. Nevertheless, the greater 
multicolinearity will lead to greater standard errors. Thus, confidence intervals for 
coefficients tend to be very wide and t-statistics tend to be very small. Then, 
coefficients have to be larger to be statistically significant. 
There are several warning signals that indicate multicolinearity. However, 
there is no irrefutable test for detecting the problem. One of the better methods is 
detection of the variance inflationary factors (VIF). According to Montgomery, Peck 
and Vining (2003) a VIF above 10 is an indication of multicolinearity. The results of 
the VIF test after a simple OLS regression are presented in tables-C13 and C14 of 
appendix C. It shows that we must be concerned about multicolinearity in the panel. 
As multicollinearity can be severe due to multiple combinations of some correlated 
variables (say dummy variables in the panels), use of some dummy variables and a 
constant in the model may reduce the problem. Further inspection shows that 
elimination of dummy variables relating to China, Mexico, Nicaragua, Thailand, 
Uruguay and Venezuela can decrease all VIF values to a level below 10. With this 
strategy interpretation of intercepts will change. The intercepts of all countries, for 
which dummy variables have been eliminated, are considered to be identically equal 
to the calculated constant term, which is common to all units. The intercept calculated 
for other countries must be added to the constant term to show the real intercept of 
each country. 
4.3.7- Estimation  
I selected a fixed effects model with AR(1)  process as follows: 
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where yit is the natural logarithm of private investment rate, αi is the country specific 
intercepts, c is constant, Xit is the vector of independent variables including natural 
logarithm of conditional variance of residuals calculated by MA process as explained 
above: domestic credit to private sector, exchange rate distortion, growth, terms of 
trade, inflation and real interest rate. 295 observations are eliminated due to missing 
values if the real interest rate is included in the model. Therefore, I estimate the model 
twice, once without real interest rate uncertainty to use maximum information and 
once with real interest rate uncertainty. When interest rate uncertainty is included, the 
coefficients of dummy variables of Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela are assumed to 
be equal to zero to reduce VIF test statistic below 10 and avoid severe 
multicollinearity. Each of these two models is estimated twice, with and without 
contemporaneous correlation, as explained before (Table-C10, appendix C for more 
clarity). Bulgaria is excluded from the estimation because it will not be explained 
well the model. A PCSE method has been used to estimate the model. I select the 
autocorrelation of residuals as a method to compute the autocorrelation.  
The results are presented in table-C10, appendix C. The results in the case of 
assumed contemporaneous correlation exhibit lower standard errors as compared to 
the case of no contemporaneous correlation. In the case of uncertainty about growth 
and terms of trade, their coefficients are significant when we consider 
contemporaneous correlation. This means that common external shocks (e.g. oil 
prices or financial crisis) affects terms of trade and growth of countries. Chi squared 
statistics of all equations lead to rejection of the null hypothesis of the Wald test that 
coefficients are jointly equal to zero. When real interest rate is excluded from the 
equation (1 and 2), uncertainty over all macroeconomic variables has a negative 
effect on private investment. Uncertainty in the form of exchange rate distortion and 
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that relating to trade, growth and terms of trade have a negative significant effect on 
private investment. The effect of uncertainty regarding domestic credit to private 
sector, inflation and real interest rate is negative but insignificant. 
 
4.4-Uncertainty about Socio-Political Institutions and conflicts 
Most of the variables are observed from 1970 to 1993. However, coups and 
constitutional changes are only observed till 1988. Data on index of inequality are 
available from 1970 to 1993. However, there are a lot of missing values. Hence to 
make a trade-off between variables and observations I will proceed as follows: I will 
carry out all tests and estimations in three steps. In the first step I shall include all 
variables except for coups, constitutional changes and inequality in order to use 
maximum information (panel a hereafter). In the next step I include coups and 
constitutional changes but not inequality. All other variables are included in the panel 
to check the effect of the first two variables between 1970 and 1988 (panel b 
hereafter). In this step Benin, Nicaragua and Poland will be excluded automatically, 
because, variables of these countries do not have common time period observations 
with other countries. And finally, in addition to the variables in panel a I will exclude 
coups and constitutional changes and include inequality instead (panel c hereafter). 
Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Nicaragua will drop out according to unequally observation 
of variables.      
Diagnostic tests are started by unit root as I have done so for macroeconomic 
uncertainty. Table-C8 of appendix C indicates the result of a Maddala and Wu test for 
panel unit root that uses augmented Dickey-Fuller transformation. The Chi squared 
statistics lead us to reject the null hypothesis of unit root for all variables at the 0.01 
significant level.  
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For the diagnoses of outliers, a box plot diagram is presented in figure-B20 of 
appendix B. Again Bulgaria shows behavior which is different from the other 
countries. The result of cross validation test for panel a, is presented in table-C9, 
appendix C. It confirms that Bulgaria with mean squared errors of 7.819 is totally 
different from other countries. As, this odd behavior is caused by the fluctuations of 
private investment, the test is not repeated for the other panels because their results 
will be the same.   
As I explained above, as the average number of observations does not exceed 
18 per country, I pooled the coefficients of variables in equation (1) to attain greater 
efficiency in estimation. However, the heterogeneity of countries in intercepts must be 
examined. The traditional F-test statistics equals 1135.9 with [37, 635] degree of 
freedom for fixed effects leading us to reject the null hypothesis of pooling at the 0.01 
level of significance for the panel a, after excluding Bulgaria as outlier. The F-
statistic of 1083.57 [34, 448] causes us to rejects the null hypothesis of pooling in 
panel b and in the same way F-statistic 36.61 [34,523] lead us to reject the null 
hypothesis of pooling in panel c. These are all significant at 0.01 level. 
Diagnosis of country-wise heteroskedasticity by a Modified Wald test yields a 
Chi squared statistics of 2371.89 [38] for panel a, 2.7*1028 [35] for panel b and 
2579.99 [35] for panel c. All of them cause us to reject the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity in error terms.  
The test for contemporaneous correlation fails to produce any outcome 
regarding singularity of correlation matrix of residuals. I apply contemporaneous 
correlation correction for more assurance. 
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data yields an F-statistic 
6.494 [1, 37] for panel a, which leads us to reject the null hypothesis of no first order 
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autocorrelation at the 0.05 level of significance. This test for panel b yields an F-
statistic 5.167 [1, 33], which causes us to reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation at 0.05 level of significance. However, it is accepted at the 0.1 level. The 
test result is 5.817 [1, 34] for panel c, causing us to reject the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation at the 0.05 level. Outcomes of diagnosis test for multicolinearity 
have presented in tables-C15, C16 and C17, appendix C. Results do not show severe 
multicollinearity in panel a, b and c. Like above, I use AR (1) process for estimation 
applying PCSE: 
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The results are presented from 1 to 3 in table-C11 of appendix C. All 
equations yielded Chi squared statistics are large enough and we can reject the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero. The level of democracy has 
direct but insignificant sign. Civil war has absolutely negative and significant effect 
on private investment at the 0.01 significant level. Purges also affects private 
investment negatively at the 0.05 significant level. Other variables, revolutions and 
strikes adversely and assassinations positively affects private investment but all of 
them are insignificant. Riots show a positive effect on private investment which is 
significant at 0.01 level for panel a, but is not significant in other panels especially in 
equation 4. Coups and constitutional changes affect private investment adversely and 
their effect is significant at the 0.01 level in panel b. Inequality in panel c, shows a 
positive effect but its effect is insignificant.  
We may be suspicious about the coefficients and standard errors of war, 
because it might be correlated with fixed effects due to the fact that it is a slowly 
moving variable as discussed before. I have applied Fixed Effects Vector 
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Decomposition (FEVD) suggested by Plumper and Troeger (2004) and retested panel 
a to control for these sluggish variables. FEVD acts as following: in the first step, the 
unit fixed effects is estimated by running a fixed effects estimate of the baseline 
model. In the next step, the unit effects are split into an explained and an unexplained 
part by regressing the unit effects on the time-invariant and rarely changing 
explanatory variables of the original model. Finally, a pooled OLS estimation of the 
baseline model will be performed by including all explanatory time variant, time 
invariant and the rarely changing variables plus the unexplained part of the fixed 
effects vector. Plumper and Troeger show by a series of Monte Carlo experiments that 
FEVD is the least biased estimator when time variant and time invariant variables are 
correlated with unit effects. This procedure produces unbiased estimates of time 
varying variables regardless of whether they are correlated with unit effects or not and 
unbiased estimates of time invariant variables that are not correlated. Only when the 
estimated coefficients of the time invariant variables are correlated with the unit 
effects this method suffer from omitted variable bias. Desirable small sample 
properties and unbiasedness in estimating the coefficients of time variant variables, 
which are correlated with the unit effects are the advantages of this method.  
The outcomes of retests have been presented in Table-C11, appendix C as 
fevd. I applied OLS again with PCSE and AR (1) estimation in the third step. The 
high F-statistic rejects the null hypothesis that coefficients are jointly equal to zero. A 
value of the Durbin-Watson statistic near 2 implies that the Prais-Winsten 
transformation has fixed the problem of autocorrelation in this panel. Riots have 
become insignificant in this panel. However, its effect has remained positive. The 
effect of democracy has remained insignificant. Other results are similar to that for 
panel a other than that for purges. This variable is significant at the 0.01 level. 
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4.5- Uncertainty about The Quality of Public Governance 
This panel contains regulatory burden, control of corruption, rule of law, 
natural logarithm of property rights and natural logarithm of government intervention 
as right hand side independent variables. Each variable has been observed over 1996, 
1998 and 2000.As Beck (2001) mentioned we cannot use PCSE method if the number 
of observations is less than 10 per unit. Hence, we must look for proper panel 
estimators that allow for confined observations. But before proceeding, the properties 
of data must be detected.  
The box plot of figure-B21, appendix B indicates that Malawi fluctuates with 
a different pattern as compared to other countries. Outcomes of cross validation test 
confirm this result in table-C9, appendix C. The mean squared error of 2.361 for this 
country is very different from that for the other ones. Therefore, this country will be 
excluded from the next tests and estimations.  
The F-statistic being 30.10 [37,56], we can reject the null hypothesis that 
coefficients of the unit effects are jointly equal to zero at the 0.01 significance level. 
Therefore, unit dummies will be included in the model to portray country 
heterogeneity, but the coefficients of variables are assumed to be constant across the 
countries through a pooling process as we discussed earlier. 
The modified Wald test for country-wise heteroskedasticity yields a Chi 
squared statistics equal to 8.1*1032 [38] and we reject the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity between countries at the 0.01 significance level. Because 
contemporaneous correlation is a problem for TSCS data and not panel data, I do not 
test for existence of this phenomenon. The Wooldridge test for serial correlation in 
panel data yields a F-statistic 26.819 (1, 23), causing us to reject the null hypothesis of 
no first order correlation among the residuals. 
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The VIF test for multicollinearity in table-C18 of appendix C indicates a 
problem. Thus, the coefficients of dummy variables of Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, 
South Korea, Madagascar, Malaysia, Philippines, Poland, Thailand and Trinidad and 
Tobago are assumed to be zero to reduce the VIF test statistic below 10. 
Regarding the outcomes of diagnostic tests we need to utilize an estimator, 
which allows for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. According to Baum(2006), 
the cluster covariance matrix estimator allows for difference in the variance of the 
errors between clusters. Furthermore, it allows for correlations between errors in the 
same cluster. Kezdi (2003) demonstrates on the basis of a Monte Carlo study that 
robust clustered estimator, when utilized for the fixed effects model, is not only 
consistent but also behaves well in finite samples. Hence, I estimated a fixed effects 
model, applying a robust clustered estimator. The outcomes are presented in table-
C12 of appendix C. LSDV does not report F statistic due to the clustering process. R 
squared is 0.879 in LSDV, which is proper. The regulatory burden, rule of law and 
property rights all have a positive effect and are significant at the 0.05 level but only 
the regulatory burden is significant at the 0.01 level. Government intervention has a 
negative but insignificant effect. The most surprising effect is about the control of 
corruption. It affects private investment negatively and is significant at the 0.1 
significant level.  
 
4.6- Outcomes Analysis 
As we discussed earlier, we expect that each kind of uncertainty restrains 
investment. Among macroeconomic variables, uncertainty about credit to private 
sector adversely affects investment. Admasu (2002) concludes that difference in the 
level of credit to private sector is the strongest explanation for variation in private 
investment across countries and over time. Our finding is that however uncertainty 
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about the future level of the credit to private sector deters investment but its effect is 
not significant. 
The second source of uncertainty stems from exchange rates. Articles in this 
field have often considered the effect of real exchange rate uncertainty on investment. 
As Serven (1998) explains it is related to the relative profitability of investment in 
domestic market v.s international market oriented activities. If the volatility of real 
exchange rate rises, it makes price signals less informative about the relative 
profitability of investment across different sectors in a way that hampers investment 
decisions. There are some studies which report an adverse and significant effect of 
real exchange rate uncertainty on investment (e.g. Serven 1997, 2002a, 2002b and 
Cottani et al, 1990). However Darby et al (1999) adds that this effect is not conclusive 
and depends upon circumstances and Byrne and Davis (2005) conclude that it is the 
transitory and not the permanent component, which adversely affects investment. We 
instead consider uncertainty about distortions of real exchange rate in the manner 
proposed by Dollar (1992). It is interpreted as uncertainty about the direction of 
government trade policy i.e. whether is outward or inward oriented. Outward oriented 
policies are reflected in relatively little variability of the real exchange rate so that 
incentives are consistent over time and encourage exports. Brunetti and Weder (1997) 
show that uncertainty about distortions of real exchange rate is very important for 
investment. My study also confirms this negative effect of uncertainty regarding 
exchange rate distortion on private investment rate. 
Unpredictability about growth is another source of uncertainty. As 
Serven(1998) explains, uncertainty of output growth is a measure of the 
unpredictability of future demand. Fuss and Vermeulen(2004), Darku(2000) and 
Fedderke(2004) have reported a significant and negative impact of uncertainty 
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regarding growth on the investment rate. Our outcomes also confirm this result and it 
shows that if investors are uncertain about future demand, they hesitate to invest. 
Terms of trade are related to the relative profitability of investment in the 
exportable merchandise sector versus import substitutive merchandise sector (Serven, 
1998). According to Easterly et al (1993), depending upon the terms of trade, capital 
might flow from domestic saving or from abroad into the export sector or the import 
substituting sector. Thus, given the terms of trade, more uncertainty makes price 
signals less informative about the relative profitability of investment and hampers the 
decision to invest. Cardoso(1993) and Serven (1997)have reported significant and 
negative impact of uncertainty regarding the terms of trade on private investment. Our 
results confirm a negative significant effect of terms of trade uncertainty on the 
private investment rate.   
It is very common in developing countries that governments abruptly ban 
export or import of some merchandise because of the need to protect customers or 
producers. An investor needs long-term policy stability in marketing, exporting or 
importing commodities. This kind of intervention mentioned above is a bad signal and 
discourages investors. Our study shows that trade policy uncertainty has adverse 
effect on the private investment rate. 
The effect of uncertainty about inflation on investment is quite complicated 
and ambiguous. At first we must aware that there is a distinction between inflation 
uncertainty and uncertainty about prices. As Cecchetti (1993) demonstrates: 
One can easily imagine a case where the monetary authorities target a 
low or zero inflation rate but allow random base drift in the price level. In this 
case, the inflation rate could become quite predictable whereas the price level 
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could remain unpredictable in the sense that its conditional variance could 
rise without bound with forecast horizon. 
With this point of view Able (1980) explains that inflation should not have 
any direct effect on private investment, except for effects on the tax structure. 
Therefore, its uncertainty also should not have any direct impact. However he does 
not reject some possible indirect effects22. For instance, Yigit (2002) shows that 
inflation uncertainty will adversely affect credit markets by reducing credit 
availability and raising the cost of borrowing. Thus, investment could be affected 
through this route. According to Oshikoya(1994) and Serven(1998) inflation is related 
to the aggregate level of profitability of capital. Therefore, its uncertainty and 
unpredictability can affect private investment adversely. Huizinga (1993) argues that 
inflation uncertainty affect investment through its impact on uncertainty regarding the 
net present value of future streams. One might argue that however the uncertainty 
about prices cannot be interpreted as inflation uncertainty but we cannot reject its 
converse, which means that inflation uncertainty cannot rise without any increase in 
uncertainty about prices. Thus, these two could be synonymous when we think about 
inflation uncertainty. The complexity of the relationship between inflation uncertainty 
and investment is because of the fact that uncertainty about inflation affects 
investment through two separate channels: uncertainty about future output prices and 
uncertainty about future variable factor costs (e.g. wages, input material prices, etc). 
Hartman (1972, 1973) and Abel (1983) demonstrate that an increase in uncertainty 
about ratio of output price to variable cost should increase capital investment. This is 
because of the fact that concavity of the production function means the benefits of 
                                                
22 -Because the effect of inflation on future streams will offset by its effect on real discount rate when 
we calculate the net present value. For more information financial management textbook 
might be studied. 
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investing in capital stock in those times when the price-cost ratio is high outweighs 
the costs of investing in capital stock in those times when the price-cost ratio is low.  
Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) show that especially in the case of investment 
projects (especially those which run for a long period) it is possible that an increase in 
uncertainty hastens the decision to invest. Including a lag between decision to invest 
and receipt of the first revenue of the project can change the investment decision. 
Under this circumstance, the investor cannot enter the market immediately. Thus, the 
opportunity cost of waiting does not depend on the price during the lag. Instead it will 
be related to the future prices. Longer intervals will increase the probability of higher 
prices. Thus the opportunity cost of waiting rises with uncertainty. This means that an 
increase in uncertainty may hasten investment in order to catch the higher prices.  
These conclusions are opposite to those of Pindyck (1991) who concludes that 
increased uncertainty about output prices decreases investment (see the literature 
review in chapter 1 for more details). On the other hand, there is no doubt uncertainty 
about costs reduces the investment because it increases the critical expected rate of 
return. Pindyck (1992) starts his argument by analogy with the put option in financial 
markets. This is based on a rule that implies that the investor invests until the 
expected cost to complete the project is not higher than a critical number. Costs of 
construction inputs vary whether or not investment is taking place. Hence, there is a 
value of waiting for information (i.e. probability of lower costs) before committing 
resources. Therefore, uncertainty about input costs reduces critical expected cost.  
Empirical results are also different. Abel (1980) finds out that an increase in 
uncertainty about future inflation – which he considers synonymous with high rate of 
inflation- reduces the investment spending. Serven (1998) also shows that inflation 
uncertainty has negative effect on investment. Byrne and Davis (2004) demonstrate 
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that inflation uncertainty can have two components (one permanent and the other 
temporary). Both of them affect investment adversely but the temporary component is 
more significant. The empirical study of Huizinga (1993) shows interestingly the 
complexity of the effect of inflation uncertainty on investment. He argues that 
inflation uncertainty leads to uncertainty about real wages, real output price, profit 
rate and the real price of materials inputs. Then, based on analysis of quarterly data 
from aggregate U.S. manufacturing from 1954-1989, he verifies that temporary 
increase in real wage uncertainty and permanent increase in output price uncertainty 
reduces investment and higher profit uncertainty leads to higher investment. And he 
shows that on the basis of cross sectional analysis during the 1958 - 1986, that 
industries with higher real wages uncertainty and with higher real price of material 
inputs uncertainty had lower investment and industries with higher real output price 
uncertainty had higher investment rate. My study shows that uncertainty with regard 
to inflation has a negative effect on the private investment rate. However its effect is 
insignificant.  
It seems that unpredictable changes in the real interest rate (which is the cost 
of money holding) must adversely affect private investment. Zalewski (1994) finds 
out there is a positive relation between risk premium and interest rate volatility. 
Bo(1999) confirms that interest rate volatility influences investment. My study shows 
that uncertainty about the real interest rate does not have a significant effect on private 
investment, though it is negative in sign. 
There is not a consensus among experts about the effect of democracy on 
private investment. This effect is vague and indirect. Keefer (2004) argues that more 
democracy means more accountability of the government. Government has to provide 
more security for property rights otherwise it will be punished either in the process of 
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elections or by free media. This argument has been confirmed by Adsera et al (2003), 
Fox (2000), Stasavage (2000), Goodin (2004), Li (2005), Li and Resnick (2001), 
Kaufman and Vicente (2005), Weingast (1995). Iyigun and Rodrik (2004) illustrate 
that the fiscal link between government and its citizens is also needed to increase 
accountability. Adsera et al (2003) demonstrates that along with accountability the 
degree of information also matters. An article published by OECD (2003) shows that 
the transparency of government is important in generating clear information and 
Bovens(2005) adds that media have an important role in this field. It has also been 
mentioned that democracy can affect investment. Ulubasoglu and Doucouliagos 
(2004) and Feng (2001) confirm that the accumulation of human capital and 
democratic behavior can facilitate the processing and aggregation of local knowledge 
in the best possible manner. Papaioannou and Siourounis(2004)  quote from some 
scholars that this relation can be direct due to lower political instability and sounder 
structural policies. 
On the other hand, Przeworski and limongi (1993) demonstrate that politics 
matters but regimes do not capture the relevant difference. Papaioannou and 
Siourounis(2004) quote (from Becker,1983) that democratic regimes can yield 
inefficient outcomes by enabling various interest groups to compete. Feng (2003) 
adds that it can spur a desire for immediate consumption that can hamper investment. 
Moreover, it allows the median voter to redistribute incomes toward the poor, 
reducing incentives to save and invest. And finally, Wu (2004) shows that in the 
presence of some structural factors autocrats do better than democracies. The result of 
my study shows however there is a positive correlation between the degree of 
democracy and private investment, but it is not significant. So, we cannot confirm any 
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relationship between the level of democracy and the rate of private investment. It is 
quite possible that the mentioned positive factors are neutralized by negative factors. 
Barro(1999) has elaborated routes through which inequality can affect private 
investment: first, if the poor tend to invest more in human capital, a reduction in 
inequality tends to encourage investment through a higher accumulation of human 
capital. Second, greater inequality makes government redistribute income because of 
the political pressures. This results in more transfer of resources, which discourages 
investment. Third, inequality can lead to more crimes, riots and sociopolitical unrest, 
which result in higher waste of resources and lower investment. But, the author finds 
out little overall relation between income inequality and the rate of investment 
through his empirical study. He also acknowledges that inequality can have different 
consequences in poor and richer countries. According to Hoft (2003) societies that 
began with more extreme inequality are more likely to make and develop 
redistributive institutions. My outcomes, however, confirm the results of Barro (1999) 
that there is no significant relationship between inequality and the rate of private 
investment. 
At the first glance, it seems there are sufficient reasons for war to increase 
uncertainty and discourage private investment. It destroys properties, increases taxes, 
causes more government intervention, monetary policy disturbance, dislocation of 
export and import trade and diversion of normally productive efforts to advance 
unproductive aims. But as Dulles (1942) mentioned: 
Destruction itself creates a need for new consumer goods. The 
conversion of industry to wartime purposes necessitates the production of new 
capital goods or the reconditioning of old plant, …, the need, in the past, has 
been so great that although surpluses of various types of commodities exist 
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side by side with shortage, the opportunity to invest has been so spectacular 
that funds have been forthcoming from many varied types of sources. 
Thus, shortage of commodities in the wartime generates price increases, 
which cover the high discount rates attributable to existing uncertainties. But, there is 
a condition. If there is a long continued political uncertainty, it will prevent expansion 
even if the economic condition is ready for further investment (Dulles, 1942). Hence, 
from this point of view there is a big difference between war and civil war. War is 
more likely to tend to national unity and smoothen differences in a country and 
generate political stability. Civil war, on the other hand, is a consequence of extreme 
and long lasting divergence and conflict within a society, which coexist with political 
instability. Therefore, we can expect that there is a likelihood of a higher private 
investment rate in wartime but there is no reason for civil war to encourage private 
investment. My empirical outcomes confirm the aforementioned argument that wars 
increase the private investment rate whereas civil wars reduce it significantly. 
There are some different routes through which sociopolitical unrest and 
instability can affect private investment. As Feng (2001) mentions, during political 
instability consumers reduce their saving and consumption rises since saving may 
become worthless. Furthermore, investors prefer to keep their properties and 
portfolios in liquid and portable forms like gold and foreign currencies that have 
better potential of retaining value. Carmignani (2001) demonstrates that political 
instability can lead to policy uncertainty and reduce security of property rights. Thus, 
a “risk averse economic agent may hesitate to take economic initiatives or may exit 
the economy by investing abroad”. Sterb (2001) concludes that political instability 
can imply uncertainty about the rules of the game. Fielding (2003) argues that 
political instability can affect investment by increase in the degree of insecurity that is 
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felt by investors along with disruption of economic activities caused by associated 
extensive unrest. My findings show that not all kinds of political instability matter for 
private investment. Purges and coups have a negative influence on private investment 
while assassinations, revolutions and strikes do not affect significantly private 
investment. The effect of riots, however, is not stable. It shows a positive significant 
effect in equations a and b of table-C11 of appendix C but its effect becomes 
insignificant in fevd method. Therefore, there is some evidence which justifies 
rejection of the hypothesis that riots have a negative effect on private investment. 
Constitutional change results in a kind of uncertainty about policies. It can 
signal more extensive and deeper changes in social, political and economical policies. 
Investors are often sensitive to such signals as these signals endanger their future 
rights and profits. Constitutional change can lead to higher perceived costs of capital 
(Rodrik, 1989 and Berg, 2001 and Jeong, 2002). Therefore, we should expect that 
investors adversely react to constitutional changes. Our findings also confirm this 
inference. 
Apart from the fact that arbitrariness and unpredictability of regulation 
discourages investment, regulations themselves as a burden could be a source of 
uncertainty: Klapper et al (2004) and Alesina et al (2003) shows that entry regulation 
hampers entry but regulation that enhances the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights or those that lead to a better condition of the financial sector encourages more 
investment. Evenett (2003) demonstrates that competition law (e.g. laws, which deter 
bid rigging, monitor mergers and acquisition and regulates new entry into industry) 
fosters the investment climate in the country. Dollar et al (2003) adds that the 
monetary and time cost of regulations have negative implications for private 
investment. North (1993) demonstrates that countries with extensive “securities 
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regulation” and strong enforcement mechanisms exhibit lower cost of capital. 
Jamison et al (2005) shows that regulatory instruments that promote policy stability 
lead to higher investment. Snodgrass (1996) shows how good quality regulations can 
foster micro finance programs. According to Loayza et al (2004) entry regulation, 
labor regulation, fiscal burden, trade barriers and financial market regulations tend to 
reduce investment as well as growth.  
Another point of view is that not only quality but also extent of regulations 
matter: Johnson and Kaufman (2001) conclude that regulation associated with a 
larger unofficial (illegal) economy implies less investment. Frye and Zhuravskaya 
(2000) show that unofficial firms have problem in enforcing their contracts, because 
they cannot use official routes for this purpose. Guadch and Hahn (1997) explain that 
unnecessary regulations can have adverse effect on investment through the costs 
imposed by them. Bolaky and Freund (2004) show that excessive regulations prevent 
resources from moving into the most productive sector and the most efficient firms 
within sectors. My empirical outcomes also confirm the negative effect of regulatory 
burdens on private investment. 
According to Lovei and Mckechnie there are different types of corruption in a 
country (e.g. petty corruption, managerial and bureaucratic corruption, and grand 
corruption) and its patterns can vary among countries and over time (Doig and Riley). 
But there is no reason to think that corruption can foster private investment. It has a 
direct and indirect adverse effect on private investment. McMillan and Woodruff 
(2002) point out that official corruption makes operating difficult for business and 
leads to expropriation of profits. It can affect entrepreneurs by increasing costs and 
operating time (Miralles, 2002). Thus, investors can lose their confidence (Ferrarini, 
2003). It can raise transaction costs and uncertainty in different parts of the economy 
  92 
(Gray and Kaufmann, 1998) and its cost can act as an unpredictable tax (Mauro, 
1997; Everhart and Sumlinski, 2001). It can lessen the competition in a country 
(Perotti and Volpin, 2004) because it distorts the rules of the game (Klitgaard, 1998; 
Khwaja and Mian, 2004; Sapienza, 2004; Hellman and Kaufmann, 2003 and 
Zemanovicova et al). Bribes divert productive resources, thus adversely affecting 
efficiency and outputs of the firms (Rodionova, 2001 and Scharfstein and Stein, 
2000).  
Corruption can adversely affect private investment through low quality public 
services and infrastructure (OECD, 2005; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997 and Mauro, 
1997). It can influence the contracts on public goods and reduce public revenues 
(Gray and Kaufmann, 1998 and Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). Along with lowering of 
the quality of public output and services it drives up the prices of services (Lee and 
Ng, 2003). Furthermore, corruption can ruin the economy and private investment 
through other channels: bureaucrats react to the opportunities for corruption by 
actually increasing red tape and reducing their bribe-free performance (Keefer, 2004). 
Thus, it can lead to heavy and unnecessary regulation and procedural formalism to 
generate bribe opportunities (Djankov et al, 2002).  
On the other hand, according to some scholars, it can speed up procedures like 
governmental permission to carry out legal activities and sometimes even illegal 
activities (Gray and Kaufmann, 1998). Such action leads to a large unofficial 
economy with hidden underground activities (Johnson and Kaufman, 2001). 
Corruption can also hamper the enforcement of regulation in a country (Klapper et al, 
2004).  
Most of the evidence is in favor of control of corruption fostering private 
investment, but my results indicate that control of corruption reduces the private 
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investment rate. There are some studies that argue that corruption can act as grease 
for fostering private investment (e.g. Bayley, 1966 and Lui, 1985). Thus, if the 
procedure for an official certification takes a month’s time without corruption, then in 
its presence the procedure can become faster. However, bribe taking itself has a 
transaction cost in form of time. Therefore, the net effect on time taken would be 
positive (see Shahid Alam, 1989). According to Shahid Alam (1989) there are 
different ways in which funds allocated for investment can be diverted for corrupt 
activities. It is likely the funds that seemingly showed as allocated for making loans 
(which often is contained within government subsidies to encourage investors to 
invest), are often overstated through collusion between government and investors and 
are diverted to meet political desires or shared out between phony investors and 
bureaucrats. In this circumstance, since there is no real commitment to control the 
usage of the loans, they are more likely to be diverted to consumption. A second way 
in which investment funds can be diverted into corruption proceeds occurs when 
bribes are used to influence the gains of public contracts for investment projects. In 
this condition, the bribe is generally paid out of savings from cheating on the terms of 
the contract. Often there can be little question of a net contribution to investment 
from such corruption because the loss in the economic value of the project resulting 
from corruption will generally exceed the saving there from.  
There is no doubt that in both ways mentioned above the book value of 
investment declared by investors is higher than real capital formation by investors. So 
when there is any action to control such corruption the book value of investment 
declines in a country. On the other hand, according to Lambsdroff (1999 a, b) along 
with the investment, corruption can affect the productivity of capital. And because we 
use the ratio of investment to GDP as the left hand side variable: 
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[Because] the productivity of capital declines, total output - that is GDP 
- drops in relation to the capital stock, meaning that the ratio of investment to 
GDP is likely to increase in reaction to corruption. 
So it is likely that when we are trying to control corruption we observe a 
decline in the rate of private investment. 
Those aspects of rule of law that encourage private investment include 
contract enforcement mechanisms, commercial norms and rules, habits and beliefs 
which lead to shared values and accumulation of human capital (Shirley, 2003). This 
is because these aspects can lessen the cost of capital (Hail and Leuz, 2004 and 
Pinheiro and Cabrel, 1999). The high cost of commercial dispute can discourage 
private investment (Broadman and Anderson, 2004) and deter firms from taking more 
chances (Bigsten et al, 1999). Well-functioning courts encourage entrepreneurs to test 
new suppliers. This is important when specific investment is needed for a relationship 
to develop (Johnson et al, 2002a). Many firms do not rely on written contracts. They 
limit their conduct to customers they know properly and incur costs when suppliers 
deliver goods late or that are below agreed upon quality (Hallward-Driemeier and 
Stewart, 2004) in the absence of contractual safeguards. Moreover, the weak legal 
environment is associated with a larger unofficial economy with hidden under ground 
activities (Johnson and Kaufman, 2001).  
Furthermore, the enforcement of rules maybe equal or even more important 
than legal rules. Thus, the existence of a strong legal enforcement is as important as 
strong laws (La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1998). The market is unlikely to function 
in the absence of contract enforcement that encourages exchange and investment 
(Davis, 2004).  
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The other determinant of private investment is crime. It diverts resources to 
protection efforts, leads to health costs because of increased stress and creates an 
environment unfriendly to productive activity (Demombynes and Ozler, 2002). For 
instance, in the case of Ugandan firms, 54 percent of firms had been victims of 
robbery and 37 percent have been victims of fraud (Reinikka and Sevensson, 1999). 
In severe circumstances it can affect investment through brain drain (Demombynes 
and Ozler, 2002). My study results confirm this analysis (see Brunetti and Weder 
1997 , Lamech and Saeed 2003, and Sharifazadeh and Bahreini 2003 for 
corroborative results). 
Property rights constitute one of the most important factors that determine 
private investment. Investors will not invest if they expect to be unable to reap the 
fruits of their investment (Johnson et al, 2002b). This can happen through the 
confiscation and expropriation of their properties by government (Besley, 1995 and 
Fafchamps and Minten, 2001 and Keefer, 2004), inadequate enforcement of 
intellectual property rights (Fink and Maskus, 2005), restriction in transfer of 
properties (Besley, 1995), theft and embezzlement (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001). 
Property rights can encourage investment through improvement in the allocation of 
resources (Claessens and Leaven, 2003). Otherwise, investors might not have 
ownership rights for turning their wealth into more productive uses (The Heritage 
Fund, 2005). For example, according to Heinsz (2000), institutional environments in 
which entrepreneurs can keep their profits through political channels leads investors 
to reallocate resources from economic to political activity. My empirical output 
confirms the direct and significant effect of property rights on the private investment 
rate. This relationship has been confirmed by other studies (e.g. Serven, 1997 and Do 
and Lyer, 2003). 
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Government participation in the economy through consumption and 
production may wipe out the private sector and lead to lower level of private 
investment. This can occur through two routes: higher the consumption of 
government as a percentage of GDP, the more are the resources the government is 
pulling from the private or free market and second, business activities of the 
government might crowd out private initiative and investment due to construction of 
government-owned monopolies in the country. However our findings do not show a 
significant relationship between government contribution in the economy and the 
private investment rate. 
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
5.1- Summary 
The importance of private investment stems from the fact that the lessening of 
extended poverty and unemployment on the one hand and achievement of sustainable 
development on the other depends on investment by the private sector. Recent studies 
have shown that private investment is more efficient and more productive than public 
investment. Existing mismanagement in public enterprises leads to inefficiency. On 
the contrary, the importance of profitability in the private sector constrains them to 
use scarce resources in the best way through maximization or optimization of 
production and investment; this would lead to increase in employment, reduction of 
poverty, sustainable development and growth. Thus the core question is that what 
factors determine the rate of private investment?  
The initial theories have emphasized the role of reduction of interest rate and 
increase in output for encouraging private investment. But there are ample grounds 
for doubting these theories. As a result, researchers have realized the importance of 
uncertainty in determining the private rate of investment. Many follow up questions 
arise: what is the mechanism through which uncertainties affect the rate of private 
investment? Can we really expect that uncertainties affect investment negatively? 
What factors can be considered to be a proxy of uncertainty? 
The remainder of chapter one explains that there are three schools dealing with 
the effect of uncertainty on economy and investment: traditional finance, neo-classics 
and post-Keynesians. They diverge through their different definitions of uncertainty 
and different assumptions about conditions in which investment decision is taken. 
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Traditional finance emphasizes on the calculation of risk premium, while the risk 
premium determines the difference between the returns of a project and portfolio of 
the entire market. Neo-classical school researches consider uncertainty of a 
phenomenon as the variance of its outcomes. The common approach to determine the 
effect of uncertainty on investment is to maximize the value of the firm under existing 
uncertainty and under different assumptions. Different assumptions yield various 
outcomes. It inherently depends on the curvature of the investment function. 
Investment functions with convex marginal adjustment costs yield a positive 
relationship with uncertainty. Irreversibility is another characteristic of a project that 
is emphasized by some researches. This assumption implies that ones that an investor 
incurs sunk costs it is almost impossible to disinvest later. This fact makes investor 
more prudent. Then the theory concludes that more uncertainty leads to lower 
investment. Another approach in neo-classical school defines uncertainty as a 
covariance between technology’s return and the discount rate. This study 
distinguishes between risks of a stock in financial markets and uncertainty in the 
value of outputs of a technology. The study follows to ascertain the effect of 
uncertainty on investment in a general equilibrium model. The article concludes that a 
mean preserving spread in distribution in the state of nature that affects firm’s 
technologies or household’s preferences has no effect on aggregate investment, but it 
alters the allocation of capital and labor among technologies.  
In chapter 2, I demonstrated that Iran has potential for high rates of 
investment. Various indices of population and literacy rates, rich natural resources 
and energy, unique geopolitical location were favorable for attaining a high rate of 
investment in the country. But it has hardly gone beyond 15 percent in the last four 
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decades. This is possibly due to the negative role played by some aspects of 
uncertainty. 
Chapter 3 indicates that post-Keynesians are intrinsically different from neo-
classics. Post-Keynesians argue that economical phenomena are the manifestation of 
individuals’ reactions to their expectations. As these expectations take shape in a 
unique situation (e.g. social, political and international circumstances) therefore these 
cannot be replicated again. Thus, it is impossible to predict the future on the basis of 
past events. The usage of expected values and variances of variables for making 
predictions is inaccurate consequently. Hence we cannot define uncertainty as a 
variance of a variable. Uncertainty is defined as something that we do not know 
anything about.  
I accept the post-Keynesian definition of uncertainty but I argue that if the 
world is identically uncertain then there must be no difference between various 
countries. It seems that the existing institutions and cultures in each country determine 
the predictability of individuals’ reactions to their expectations. Thus, the future is 
predictable to different extents in different countries. The level of predictability in 
each country can also vary over the time depending upon the changes in institutions. 
The level of unpredictability about the future can lead to a reduction in the private 
investment rate. I define an element of uncertainty as any factor, which distorts 
information and predictions about the future. Often, studies concentrate on uncertainty 
about prices, demand or costs and deal with them by maximizing the value of the firm 
through the expectation of all future probable receipts. But, by foregoing definition, it 
embraces a wide range of factors that bring about not only unpredictable fluctuations 
in prices but also affect the state of confidence of entrepreneurs and their trust on 
information at hand. There must be a time horizon within which entrepreneurs can 
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rely on information and assess their projects through the comparison of the adjusted 
pay back period of their projects with that horizon.  
The length of the time horizon is calculable. If price fluctuates with geometric 
Brownian motion then each movement of price in the next period can be predicted on 
the basis of current price and the variance of past fluctuations. My intuition is that 
investors use the best worst strategy instead of maximization of expected returns in an 
uncertain environment. This is because the strategy which emerges for such 
maximization is totally useless if the worst scenario actually results happens. This 
means that the investor supposes that price decreases continuously with a geometric 
Brownian motion (worst condition).  If this is the case, then the time horizon is 
defined as the time that it takes for the current price to reach the lower price (lower 
bound) that occurs in the past. This time horizon is compared with adjusted payback 
period of projects. Projects with longer adjusted payback period will be rejected. 
Among the viable projects, a project with shorter adjusted payback period is 
preferable. The more is the uncertainty about the future, the shorter the horizon within 
which information can be trusted. This time horizon depends on types of uncertainty 
that result in an optimistic or pessimistic atmosphere about business. The effect of 
uncertainty on investment can be compared with catalysts in chemical reactions. 
These factors might not have any direct participation in a reaction but they affect it. 
Therefore, instead of assessing the impact of unpredictable future receipts on private 
investment, the effect of each possible factor resulting in uncertainty is examined for 
its impact on the private investment rate.  
In chapter 4 twenty three factors relating to uncertainty are classified into three 
different categories: changes in policies and macroeconomic outcomes, the quality of 
public governance and socio- political institutions and conflicts. A panel data method 
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is applied even though my study is about Iran. It is because of two reasons: first, 
shortage of data in some variables like rule of law, control of corruption and property 
rights, make it impossible to utilize time series methods. Second, there are some 
factors, which hardly change over time for example, democracy or property rights. So, 
the analysis of these factors in a time series process is almost impossible. The 
methodology of panel data gives us the opportunity to take these factors into account 
in our analyses. The data have been collected about 39 countries including Iran. The 
data have been examined for diagnosis of unit root, serial correlation, 
contemporaneous correlation, outliers, heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity. In 
macroeconomic panel a fixed effects model with AR (1) is applied to allow for serial 
correlations. The coefficient of some dummy variables of some countries were 
eliminated and a constant term is put in the model to reduce the effect of existing 
multicollinearity. A PCSE estimator is utilized to allow for heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation. The panel is estimated twice once with inflation 
uncertainty and once with real interest rate uncertainty. These two variables are not 
used simultaneously to avoid severe multicollinearity.  The panel of socio-political 
institutions and conflicts does not exhibit multicollinearity. Yet there is a suspicion 
about multicollinearity between slow moving variables like war and dummy 
variables. Therefore, a Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition  (FEVD) model is used in 
addition to PCSE to control for this kind of variables. The effect of inequality, coups 
and constitutional changes is estimated in different panels so as to facilitate maximum 
use of data. In the panel for the quality of governance, there were at most three 
observations per country. Again the coefficients of some dummy variables are 
equated to zero and a constant term is added to model to avoid severe 
multicollinearity. Therefore, a LSDV with cluster covariance matrix is applied to 
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allow for a small number of observations per country, heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation existing in the data. Depending on different properties of panels, proper 
estimators (e.g. PCSE, FEVD or LSDV) have been employed.  
5.2- Empirical Findings 
The main finding is that not all suggested measures of uncertainty are 
significant in determining the private investment rate. Among the macroeconomic 
factors I cannot find enough evidence to reject the hypothesis of negative effect of 
uncertainty relating to exchange rate distortion, terms of trade, growth and trade on 
private investment rate. Other factors (i.e. uncertainty about credit to private sector, 
inflation and real interest rate) have an insignificant effect on the rate of private 
investment. 
The elasticity of the private investment rate to exchange rate distortion 
uncertainty is - 0.0343. The elasticity of the private investment rate to uncertainty 
about growth, trade and terms of trade are –0.018 , -0.124  and –0.0352 respectively.  
 Among the socio-political institutions and conflict factors the negative effect 
of civil war, purges, coups and constitutional changes cannot be rejected. There is not 
enough evidence that other measures of socio-political uncertainty (i.e. democracy, 
revolutions, inequality, assassinations, strikes and riots) have a significant impact on 
the private investment rate. However I cannot reject the positive effect of war on the 
private investment rate.  
The growth rate of the private investment rate for every unit change in civil 
wars, purges, coups and constitutional changes are –0.341 , -0.0431 , -0.139  and        
–0.108  , respectively. However, The growth rate of the private investment rate for 
every unit change in war is 0.173.  
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Among the indices of the quality of public governance, there is not enough 
evidence to reject the hypothesis that worsening condition of regulatory burden, rule 
of law and property rights will reduce the private investment rate. However, the 
hypothesis of negative effect of government contribution in economy on the private 
investment rate can be rejected. The effect of corruption on the private investment rate 
is quite surprising. While intuition says that corruption has a negative effect on the 
private investment rate, our evidence rejects this hypothesis. This could be because of 
the effect of corruption proceeds disguised as investment as well as the negative effect 
of corruption on GDP operating through its effect on capital productivity.  
The growth rate in the private investment for every unit change in regulatory 
burdens and rule of law are 0.408 , 0.46 respectively. The elasticity of the private 
investment rate to property right is 0.625. However, the growth rate in the private 
investment for every unit change in control for corruption is –0.215.  
As some coefficients have come in form of elasticity and the others have come 
in form of growth rate we cannot compare them except we multiply the growth rate 
by its related variable, which means that the elasticity of the second form is not fix.23 
As data are not available for a common year among these three panels, this 
comparison is not carried out. But if we want to compare elasticities with each other, 
property rights occupies first place following by trade uncertainty, terms of trade 
uncertainty, exchange rate distortion uncertainty and growth uncertainty. And among 
variables that their coefficients have come in form of growth, rule of law occupies the 
first place, following by regulatory burdens, civil war, coups, constitutional changes 
and purges. In both groups governance quality variables show higher rank in 
                                                
23 - The equations have come in appendix A for better clarification.  
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comparing to macroeconomic uncertainty and socio-political institutions and 
conflicts. 
5.3- Policy implications 
To sum up, the lack of investment is not a hard problem but a soft problem. 
This means that we cannot solve this problem mechanically simply by a fiscal or 
monetary policy. Instead it must be considered as a net outcome of socio-politico-
economical problems. Investors need a stable and predictable policy and political 
environment along with rigorously enforced, market friendly regulations to be 
confident about investing their resources. This sadly has not been the case in Iran 
where political stability has been endangered by violent disturbances, and the free 
functioning of the market mechanism has been hindered by anti market phenomena 
such as unnecessary regulations, not properly protected property rights or lawlessness.    
In case of terms of trade uncertainty maybe we cannot do much uncertainties 
are external and out of control. But in Iran extraordinary dependence to oil export 
income could jeopardizes private investment. Thus, a policy toward diversification of 
exports can encourage investors by reducing the ill effect of terms of trade 
uncertainty. 
Investors must be assured about the exchange rates policies of the government. 
They must be clear as to whether the policy is inward or outward-oriented and also 
feel assured about the certainty of the policy. Every change in strategy must be 
accompanied by faster awareness and preparedness of investors. The same is true 
about trade policy. It is very common in foreign trade policy for government to 
abruptly ban the exports of agricultural products, cement or steel to control domestic 
prices or the imports of some other goods on the pretext of protecting the domestic 
industries. Apart from the advantages and disadvantages of this policy, this kind of 
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sharp U-turns will hamper private investment. Therefore, in the case of inevitable 
situations it is better that the government gives due notice before enforcing a policy so 
as to allow the entrepreneurs time to adjust their strategies with the new law. 
Dramatic changes often occur after presidential elections in Iran. This is because new 
presidents change executive authorities across the board. It leads to dramatic changes 
in policies and strategies. Thus, a restriction of presidential power to change executive 
authorities and officers can lead to more stable outcomes.  
The government must follow policies that lead to a predictable rate of growth. 
In case of Iran unpredictable changes in crude oil prices is one of the causes of the 
growth unpredictability. Reinvesting the oil export incomes in a portfolio in 
international financial markets with more predictable returns could be a good strategy 
for elimination of the effect of unpredictability of the oil export proceeds on the 
growth. As governments in Iran try to neutralize the budget deficit by money supply, 
an unpredictable budget deficit can lead to an unpredictable growth rate through 
unpredictable monetary policies. Every year the government tries to anticipate next 
year’s income on basis of next year’s expected expenditure. Given that the budget for 
each year is planned in advance of the actual accrual of oil revenues that finance such 
expenditures, the uncertainty in revenues can lead to unforeseen budget deficits. 
Therefore, writing of budget on basis of the more certain and reliable incomes can 
help to fix this problem.  
Politically, it is very important that policies can preserve human capital as well 
as prevent severe social unrests and arm conflicts like civil wars. As social unrests 
and conflicts can lead to uncertainty for investors and lead to a reduction in 
investments, a well-tailored policy is needed to solve the socio-political problems 
without giving rise to uncertainties. Iran has experienced some cases of ethnic 
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conflicts especially in frontier areas, and also social unrests in the last four decade. It 
also has experienced some purges. As these problems are always mixed with security 
aspects the security authorities should contemplate on the economic consequences of 
their strategies and policies.  
Policies for a better quality of governance might have the largest effect on the 
private investment rate because they function as fundamental infrastructure for 
production and business activities. Changing regulations, for bringing about proper 
market friendly reforms by reducing the red tape, is a must. In Iran a reform in labor 
market and trade regulation is a necessity. One of the most effective strategies is a 
continuous education of policy makers, particularly of the legislature. As these 
members change over the time and sometimes inexperienced individuals enter the 
legislature, a continuous process of education of members can enhance their 
effectivity. Another strategy could be promoting think tanks in the country. 
Professionals and highly skilled specialists in different fields can help the policy 
makers in their activities.  
Enhancing the rule of law and property rights, especially intellectual property, 
needs reforms in cultural as well as judicial infrastructures. A powerful judicial 
system must rigorously enforce rights and contracts and prevent fraud in a time and 
cost effective way. Time and cost effective procedures have been recently emphasized 
by the World Bank in a project, which is named as Doing Business. Separation of 
commercial claims courts from other kinds of courts and development of 
specialization in settlement of commercial claims can lead to a more time and cost 
effective judicial system and thereby a better rule of law.  
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APPENDIX A 
A Brief Review of Abel (1983): 
Suppose the firm is risk natural and maximizes the expected present value of 
its cash flow subject to the capital accumulation: 
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where r is the discount rate, δ is the rate of depreciation and σ2 denotes the variance. 
This equation shows that the optimal rate of investment is an increasing function of 
qt24 and It depends on qt and is independent of Kt. Since, It is increasing function of qt 
and depends on it, we can determine the qualitative effect of uncertainty on 
investment simply by analyzing the effect of uncertainty on qt. From (1) it is clear that 
for a given level of the current price of output pt, an increase in uncertainty, as 
captured by an increase in σ2, will increase It, and it is independent of the convexity of 
marginal adjustment function. 
 
                                                
24 - It is known as “marginal q” . 
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A Summary of Solving the Maximization Problem by Pindyck (1991): 
We want a rule that maximizes the value of our investment opportunity F(V):  
])[(max)( ttt eIVEVF
  
Hence, after some substitutions and simplicity we will have  
0)(
2
1 22  FVFFV VVV        (2) 
Now suppose the price of output P follows the stochastic process: 
PdzPdtdP    
And assume that α<μ. If the output is a storable commodity, δ will represent 
the net marginal convenience yield from storage, that is, the flow of benefits (less 
storage costs) that the marginal stored unit provides. For simplicity we assume that δ 
is constant and marginal and average production cost is equal to a constant, C and that 
the project can be cheaply shut down if P becomes less than C and then can be 
restarted if prices goes above the C. Another assumption is that the project produce 
one unit per period, it is infinitely lived and invests sunk cost of I. With these 
assumptions two problems are to be solved. First, finding the value of the project 
V(P). Second, with the value of the project in hand, we must value the firm’s option to 
invest in it, and determine the optimal exercise (investment) rule. This will reduce to 
finding a critical P*, where the firm invest only if P≥P*. In a same way that we 
reached to equation (2) we will have: 
0)()(
2
1 22  CPjrVPVrVP PPP       (3) 
That j=1 if P≥C and j=0 otherwise. This equation must be solved subject to 
the following boundary conditions: 
I) V(0)=0 
II) V(C-)=V(C+) 
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III) VP(C-)=VP(C+) 
IV) 
r
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The condition (IV) says that as P becomes very large the probability that over 
any finite time period it will fall bellow cost and production will cease become very 
small. The conditions (II) and (III) show that the value of the project, is a continuous 
and smooth function of P. The solution for equation (3) will yield:  
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That β1, β2 , A1, A2 are functions of r, δ , σ and C. When P<C then project is not 
producing, then, 11
PA is the value of the option of the firm to produce in the future, 
when price increase. When P≥C the project is producing. If firm continuous to 
produce in future, the present value of the future flow of profits would be given by 
r
CP


. Whenever P fall, the firm can stop producing and avoid losses the value of its 
options to stop producing is 22
PA . To solve the second problem, similarly the value 
of the firm’s option to invest, F(P) must satisfy the: 
0)(
2
1 22  rFPFrFP PPP   
Subject to  
I) F(0)=0 
II) F(P*)=V(P*)-I 
III) FP(P*)=VP(P*) 
The solution is 
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That α , β1 and β2 are the functions of r, δ , σ , and P* that P* is the solution to  
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That can be simply solved numerically. The study indicates in a diagram that 
an increase in σ can lead to an increase in V(P) for any P. The project is a set of call 
options on future production, so, the greater the volatility of prices, the greater the 
value of these options. Increase in σ also increases the critical price P* 
because 0
*




P
. The reason is that for any P, the opportunity cost of investing F(P) 
increases even more the V(P). So, increases uncertainty, reduces investment. 
Unit Root Test 
The first challenge that must be dealt with is detection of unit root in the data 
to avoid spurious regression. There are some types of unit root tests in panel level, 
Maddala and Wu (1999), Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003)  
(Unlike the two later, Fisher test of Maddala and Wu does not need to complete panel 
so I utilize this test for detection of unit root in data). This test combines the p-values 
from N independent unit root tests.  Based on the p-values of individual unit root 
tests, Fisher’s test assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis 
against the alternative that at least one series in the panel is stationary. Table-5 shows 
the results of the test on variables. There is evidence that shows we cannot accept the 
null hypothesis of non-stationarity in all variables. So, no one of the variables in this 
panel has unit root. Hence, we can proceed without any concern about spurious 
regression. 
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Equations Applied in the Study 
Equations used in different panels are presented here. Subscriptions i and t , 
which are applied to indicate unites and time respectively, are eliminated except 
where that their elimination are misleading.  
1- Changes in policies and macroeconomics outcomes: 
  )inf(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln)(lnln 654321 lttotgrowthexrdisdcpsccpri i  
  int)(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln)(lnln 654321 ttotgrowthexrdisdcpsccpri i
 
2- Socio-political institutions and conflicts: 




)()(
)()()()()()(ln
87
654321
revritptm
prgptmstkptmasscwrwardemcpri i  




)()()()(
)()()()()()(ln
10987
654321
concoprevritptm
prgptmstkptmasscwrwardemcpri i  




)()()(
)()()()()()(ln
987
654321
inqrevritptm
prgptmstkptmasscwrwardemcpri i  
3- Quality of public governance: 
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APPENDIX B 
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Figure B1- Uncertainty about credit to private sector vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B2- Uncertainty about exchange rate distortion vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B3- Uncertainty about growth vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B4- Uncertainty about real interest rate vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B5- Uncertainty about trade vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B6- Uncertainty about terms of trade vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B7- Uncertainty about inflation vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B8- Inequality vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B9- Democracy vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B10- War vs private investment rate 
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Figure B11- civil war vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B12- Revolution vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B13- Constitutional change vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B14- Coups va private investment rate. 
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Figure B15- Riots vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B16- Strikes vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B17- Purges vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B18- Assassination vs private investment rate. 
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Figure B19- Box plot of macroeconomic uncertainty panel. 
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Figure B20- Box plot of socio-political institutions and conflicts panel. 
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Figure B21- Box plot of the panel of the quality of governance. 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C4- List of MA processes. 
Country 
Credit to 
private 
sector 
Exchange 
rate 
distortion 
Growth Inflation Interest rate 
Terms of 
trade Trade 
Argentina 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 
Bangladesh 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 
Benin 3 2 1 3 3 3 1 
Bolivia 3 3 3 -3 -3 1 -3 
Brazil 3 1 3 3 -3 3 -3 
Bulgaria 2 2 -3 3 2 2 2 
Chile 2 3 3 2 1 2 2 
China 1 3 3 2 -3 3 3 
Colombia 2 4 4 3 1* 3 3 
Costa Rica 1 3 3 2 3 2 2 
Cote d'Ivoire 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Dominican Republic 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 
Ecuador 3 3 3 -1 3 4 1 
Egypt 2 3 3 3 -3 1 1 
El Salvador 2 3 -1 3 4 2 3 
Guatemala 3 1 4 3 3 1 2 
Haiti 3 1 -2 -2 2 1 3 
India 2 2 3 3 3 2 1 
Indonesia 3 3 3 3 -3 3 2 
Iran 2 3 -3 2 2 2 3 
Kenya 1 3 3 2 3 3 3 
Korea 3 3 -3 1 -3 2 3 
Madagascar 3 3 -2 4 3 3 2 
Malawi 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 
Malaysia 2 3 2 2 1 3 3 
Mauritius 2 4 3 2 3 1 3 
Mexico 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 
Morocco 2 3 3 2 -3 3 3 
Nicaragua 3 3 -2 3 -2 2 3* 
Panama 3 2 3 3 1 3 3 
Papua New Guinea 3 2 3 3 1 1 3 
Philippines 3 2 1 2 -3 2 3 
Poland 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 
South Africa 3 1 3 2 3 2 3 
Thailand 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Trinidad and Tobago 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Tunisia 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Uruguay 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 
Venezuela 3 2 -2 2 -3 2 3 
1- Numbers indicates the order of MA process 
2- Minus(-) shows intercept excluded of equation. 
*      Dummy included for outliers 
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Table C5 - List of variables. 
lnpri                Natural logarithm of private investment rates 
lndcps             Natural logarithm of uncertainty about domestic credit to private sector 
lnexrdis           Natural logarithm of uncertainty about exchange rate distortion 
lngrowth         Natural logarithm of uncertainty about growth 
lntot                Natural logarithm of uncertainty about terms of trade 
lnt                   Natural logarithm of uncertainty about  trade 
lninfl               Natural logarithm of uncertainty about inflation 
lnint                Natural logarithm of uncertainty about real interest rate 
dem                 Index of democracy 
war                 Dummy variable for war 
cwr                 Dummy variable for civil war 
ass                  Assassinations 
stkptm            Strikes(per ten million) 
prgptm            Purges(per ten million) 
ritptm              Riots(per ten million) 
rev                   Revolutions 
inq                   Inequality 
cop                  Coups 
con                  Constitutional changes 
rgq                  Regulatory burden 
cor                   Control of corruption 
rol                   Rule of law 
prt                   Property rights 
lnprt                Natural logarithm of property rights 
gin                  Government participation in the economy 
lngin                Natural logarithm of government participation in the economy 
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Table F3- Summary statistics of data. 
    Variable        Obs          Mean    Std. Dev.      Min            Max 
           lnpri        927          2.481          .489    -1.203         3.538 
        lndcps       1095        -2.742        1.348    -5.511           .938 
     lnexrdis       1105          -3.83        1.419  -12.515          1.487 
    lngrowth      1122          2.671          .964   -4.923           5.491 
           lntot       1122        -3.769        1.474 -12.206          2.203 
              lnt       1119        -3.347        1.644   -9.604          2.717 
          lninfl      1122         -4.698       1.756  -10.149            .118 
           lnint        659           3.897       1.875   -1.002         13.343 
           dem         929           -.800        7.141       -10                10 
            war         936             .058         .235           0                  1 
            cwr         936             .101         .302           0                  1 
             ass         920             .469       1.799           0                25 
       stkptm         920             .356        1.358          0           19.31 
      prgptm         920             .102          .626          0             13.9 
        ritptm         920             .464        1.447          0         10.597 
            rev          920            .213          .523          0                  3 
             inq         786         44.140       5.518  26.747         58.975 
            cop         729             .034         .189           0                  2 
            con         729             .089         .289           0                  2 
            rgq         117             .237          .591   -1.624          1.523 
            cor          116           -.195         .563   -1.052          1.556 
             rol         117           -.112          .596   -1.495          1.313 
            gef         117            -.043          .578   -1.468          1.413 
             prt         115           2.878         .919            1                 5 
          lnprt         115             .994          .384           0          1.609 
             gin         115          2.843          .904        1.5                 5 
          lngin         115            .993          .327      .405          1.609 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  126 
Table C4- Pairwise correlation of independent variables in macroeconomic panel. 
 lndcps lnexrdis lngrowth lntot lnt lninfl lnint 
lndcps 1       
lnexrdis 0.0272 1      
lngrowth 0.0598 -0.1268 1     
lntot 0.2174 -0.0045 0.0949 1    
lnt 0.2937 0.2812 0.0167 -0.0144 1   
lninfl 0.2709 0.0266 0.3253 0.1946 0.3399 1  
lnint 0.2279 -0.075 0.2832 0.4869 0.1371 0.7137 1 
 
Table C5- Pairwise correlation among socio-political institutions and conflicts panel. 
 dem war cwr ass stkptm prgptm ritptm rev inq cop con 
dem 1.000           
war -0.086 1.000          
cwr 0.0755 0.258 1.000         
ass 0.0544 -0.001 0.278 1.000        
stkptm 0.1074 -0.050 0.006 0.045 1.000       
prgptm -0.105 -0.009 0.010 0.102 0.034 1.000      
ritptm -0.005 0.049 0.094 0.108 0.283 0.083 1.000     
rev 0.0105 -0.031 0.320 0.213 0.057 0.245 0.139 1.000    
inq 0.1289 0.001 0.063 0.072 0.015 -0.025 -0.029 0.113 1.000   
cop -0.106 0.006 0.090 0.077 0.096 0.237 0.061 0.433 0.031 1.000  
con -0.03 0.044 0.175 0.043 0.061 0.023 0.034 0.265 0.018 0.369 1.000 
 
Table C6- Pairwise orrelation of governance quality variables. 
 rgq cor rol lnprt lngin 
rgq 1     
cor 0.5451 1    
rol 0.594 0.8421 1   
lnprt -0.5887 -0.5519 -0.678 1  
lngin -0.4446 -0.1083 -0.1301 0.3252 1 
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Table C7- List of the countries. 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Poland 
South Africa 
Thailand 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
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Table C8- Maddala and Wu unit root test. 
Variable Lags Drift Stat Conclusion 
Lnpri 1   132.1*** I(0) 
Lndcps 1   502.89*** I(0) 
Lnexrdis 1   461.16*** I(0) 
Lngrowth 1   365.62*** I(0) 
Lntot 1   606.88*** I(0) 
Lnt 1   598.6*** I(0) 
Lninfl 1   251.9*** I(0) 
Lnint 1   752.8*** I(0) 
dem 1 y 150.15*** I(0) 
war 1 y 97.05*** I(0) 
cwr 1 y 86.42*** I(0) 
ass 1   211.6*** I(0) 
stkptm 1   241.3*** I(0) 
prgptm 1   437.9*** I(0) 
ritptm 1   283.4*** I(0) 
rev 1   225.48*** I(0) 
inq 1 y 163.24*** I(0) 
cop 1 y 104.62*** I(0) 
con 1   193.64*** I(0) 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
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Table C9- Results for cross validation. 
Country Macroeconomic Panel 
Institutions 
Panel 
Governance 
Panel 
Argentina 0.044 0.073 0.014 
Bangladesh 0.11 0.376 0.179 
Benin 0.199 0.336 0.015 
Bolivia 0.387 0.637 0.235 
Brazil 0.138 0.092 0.085 
Bulgaria 2.199 7.819 0.757 
Chile 0.535 0.641 0.030 
China 0.3 0.199 0.233 
Colombia 0.205 0.045 0.079 
Costa Rica 0.046 0.083 0.022 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.286 0.608 0.075 
Dominican Republic 0.097 0.130 0.038 
Ecuador 0.049 0.034 0.048 
Egypt 0.053 0.078 0.030 
El Salvador 0.092 0.11 0.016 
Guatemala 0.068 0.072 0.020 
Haiti 0.457 0.47 0.572 
India 0.099 0.057 0.023 
Indonesia 0.428 0.123 0.291 
Iran 0.0656 0.093 0.550 
Kenya 0.05 0.02 0.016 
Korea 0.383 0.611 0.241 
Madagascar 1.074 1.26 0.424 
Malawi 0.735 0.512 2.361 
Malaysia 0.206 0.185 0.162 
Mauritius 0.14 0.176 0.008 
Mexico 0.159 0.019 0.116 
Morocco 0.043 0.016 0.018 
Nicaragua 0.242 0.043 0.294 
Panama 0.267 0.69 0.329 
Papua New Guinea 0.302 0.226 0.613 
Philippines 0.124 0.247 0.021 
Poland 0.169 0.536 0.209 
South Africa 0.037 0.041 0.016 
Thailand 0.529 0.393 0.109 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.309 0.117 0.095 
Tunisia 0.096 0.069 0.013 
Uruguay 0.115 0.122 0.197 
Venezuela 0.1 0.147 0.096 
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Table C10- Results for macroeconomic uncertainty panel estimation. 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 model1 model2 model3 model4 
          
lndcps -0.0102 -0.0102 -0.0344 -0.0344 
 [0.0284] [0.0208] [0.0400] [0.0401] 
     
lnexrdis -0.0343 -0.0343 0.0358 0.0358 
 [0.0169]** [0.0172]** [0.0291] [0.0318] 
     
lngrowth -0.018 -0.018 -0.205 -0.205 
 [0.0136] [0.0105]* [0.0377]*** [0.0420]*** 
     
lntot -0.0352 -0.0352 -0.0873 -0.0873 
 [0.0165]** [0.0125]*** [0.0466]* [0.0442]** 
     
lnt -0.124 -0.124 -0.234 -0.234 
 [0.0262]*** [0.0229]*** [0.0458]*** [0.0415]*** 
     
lninfl -0.0147 -0.0147   
 [0.0233] [0.0196]   
     
lnint   -0.001 -0.001 
   [0.0157] [0.0148] 
     
_cons 1.886 1.886 1.763 1.763 
 [0.164]*** [0.132]*** [0.231]*** [0.224]*** 
          
N 892 892 597 597 
R-sq 0.499 0.499 0.702 0.702 
chi2 545.8 22488.9 1275.8 3886.3 
rho 0.5871 0.5871 0.5296 0.5296 
contemporaneous correlation NO YES NO YES 
          
Standard errors in brackets   
* p<0.1,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01   
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Table C11- Results for socio-political institutions and conflicts. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 a b c fevd 
          
dem 0.00333 -0.00643 0.00427 0.00482 
 [0.00349] [0.00326]** [0.00520] [0.00398] 
     
war -0.0116 -0.00372 -0.0254 0.173 
 [0.0515] [0.0616] [0.0455] [0.0537]*** 
     
cwr -0.253 -0.225 -0.258 -0.341 
 [0.0493]*** [0.0655]*** [0.0626]*** [0.00596]*** 
     
ass 0.00237 0.00123 0.0048 0.00208 
 [0.00427] [0.00493] [0.00568] [0.00810] 
     
stkptm -0.00306 -0.0193 -0.00579 -0.00294 
 [0.00549] [0.00839]** [0.00721] [0.0381] 
     
prgptm -0.053 -0.0571 -0.0648 -0.0431 
 [0.0209]** [0.0246]** [0.0376]* [0.00938]*** 
     
ritptm 0.0188 0.0221 0.0201 0.0225 
 [0.00643]*** [0.00390]*** [0.0105]* [0.0227] 
     
rev -0.015 -0.0000271 -0.0288 -0.00893 
 [0.0157] [0.0155] [0.0185] [0.0389] 
     
cop  -0.139   
  [0.0416]***   
     
con  -0.108   
  [0.0271]***   
   0.00643  
inq   [0.00713]  
     
     
_cons    2.505 
    [0.0217]*** 
          
N 681 493 567 642 
R-sq 0.975 0.985 0.975 0.638 
chi2 419762.9 1010487.3 399931.4  
F    1077.5 
rho 0.493 0.3627 0.4884 0.612 
          
Standard errors in brackets   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
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Table C12- Outcome for quality of governance uncertainty. 
 (1) 
 lnpri 
    
rgq 0.408 
 [0.135]*** 
  
cor -0.215 
 [0.125]* 
  
rol 0.46 
 [0.204]** 
  
lnprt -0.625 
 [0.263]** 
  
lngin -0.0967 
 [0.153] 
  
_cons 4.607 
 [0.592]*** 
    
N 99 
R-sq 0.879 
     
Standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, **** p<0.01 
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Table C13- Outcomes of VIF test for macroeconomics uncertainty panel (without uncertainty of 
real interest rate). 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
lninfl 19 0.052626 
lnt 13.86 0.072169 
lndcps 10.16 0.098379 
new_5 8.49 0.117811 
lnexrdis 5.83 0.171522 
new_26 5.73 0.174506 
new_8 5.43 0.184139 
lntot 5.27 0.189822 
new_28 5.11 0.195672 
new_25 5.07 0.197363 
new_1 5.01 0.199746 
new_37 4.99 0.200226 
new_22 4.97 0.201096 
new_32 4.94 0.202426 
new_24 4.87 0.205497 
new_7 4.78 0.209305 
new_34 4.6 0.217497 
new_18 4.51 0.221811 
new_35 4.43 0.225537 
new_20 4.32 0.231723 
new_9 4.27 0.234296 
new_21 4.02 0.248677 
new_27 3.81 0.262652 
lngrowth 3.73 0.267875 
new_38 3.71 0.26944 
new_19 3.52 0.283796 
new_2 3.52 0.28394 
new_4 3.5 0.285635 
new_15 3.46 0.289095 
new_16 3.35 0.298291 
new_12 3.23 0.309158 
new_10 3.21 0.311302 
new_30 3.09 0.323413 
new_14 2.96 0.338095 
new_13 2.82 0.354462 
new_33 2.77 0.360748 
new_29 2.69 0.37229 
new_17 2.61 0.383632 
new_31 2.59 0.386193 
new_23 2.44 0.409729 
new_36 2.31 0.433482 
new_3 2.2 0.454515 
new_11 2.07 0.482304 
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Table C14-Outcomes of VIF test for macroeconomics uncertainty panel (without uncertainty of 
inflation). 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
lntot 38.75 0.025806 
lndcps 30.62 0.032658 
lnt 30.27 0.03304 
lnexrdis 16.23 0.0616 
new_8 15.17 0.065934 
new_28 14.1 0.07091 
new_30 12.85 0.077816 
new_22 12.75 0.078443 
new_4 11.5 0.086919 
lngrowth 11.34 0.088152 
new_25 11.15 0.089657 
new_32 11.03 0.090693 
new_35 10.7 0.093495 
new_33 10 0.100037 
new_26 9.27 0.107894 
lnint 9.05 0.110514 
new_34 8.11 0.123354 
new_37 7.89 0.126696 
new_24 7.81 0.127968 
new_18 7.78 0.128576 
new_7 7.01 0.142564 
new_2 6.69 0.149477 
new_38 5.92 0.168869 
new_19 5.85 0.170876 
new_10 4.89 0.204421 
new_20 4.71 0.212421 
new_9 4.57 0.218772 
new_21 4.53 0.220567 
new_14 4.51 0.22171 
new_16 4.24 0.235651 
new_1 4.15 0.240814 
new_29 4.11 0.243568 
new_27 3.75 0.266759 
new_31 3.12 0.32059 
new_36 3.03 0.330063 
new_13 2.85 0.350598 
new_5 2.69 0.372036 
new_23 2.35 0.425916 
new_15 2.27 0.441094 
new_11 2.26 0.441796 
new_12 2.1 0.476581 
new_3 1.83 0.546459 
new_17 1.46 0.684015 
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Table C15- outcomes of VIF test for panel a, socio-political uncertainty and conflicts. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
new_34 3.98 0.251557 
new_20 3.93 0.254262 
new_37 3.85 0.259548 
new_21 3.79 0.26402 
new_16 3.7 0.270368 
new_32 3.67 0.272598 
new_27 3.61 0.276758 
new_24 3.61 0.277114 
new_38 3.53 0.282995 
new_7 3.53 0.283037 
new_1 3.51 0.284757 
new_5 3.48 0.287125 
new_15 3.48 0.287299 
new_22 3.46 0.288999 
new_9 3.45 0.289563 
new_35 3.44 0.290351 
new_18 3.4 0.294042 
new_28 3.4 0.29415 
new_12 3.37 0.296801 
new_25 3.35 0.298466 
new_13 3.35 0.298789 
new_10 3.31 0.302522 
new_2 3.29 0.304347 
dem 3.15 0.31764 
new_26 2.75 0.363356 
new_8 2.68 0.372886 
cwr 2.59 0.385699 
new_19 2.56 0.390204 
new_14 2.41 0.414431 
new_17 2.33 0.428373 
new_31 2.26 0.442625 
new_30 2 0.499774 
new_11 1.99 0.503379 
new_36 1.99 0.503772 
new_23 1.97 0.50743 
new_4 1.7 0.589169 
war 1.68 0.596609 
rev 1.51 0.664451 
new_33 1.5 0.668213 
new_29 1.45 0.691481 
ass 1.4 0.711794 
new_3 1.4 0.713464 
ritptm 1.33 0.752497 
stkptm 1.3 0.766628 
prgptm 1.19 0.841847 
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Table C16- outcomes of VIF test for panel b,  socio-political uncertainty and conflicts. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
new_20 5.75 0.173824 
new_37 5.6 0.178694 
new_21 5.44 0.183812 
new_34 5.41 0.184976 
new_16 5.36 0.186694 
new_7 5.23 0.191174 
new_27 5.18 0.193169 
new_22 5.17 0.193587 
new_1 5.16 0.193778 
new_38 5.13 0.19487 
new_32 5.1 0.195968 
new_15 5.08 0.196943 
new_5 5.06 0.197514 
new_35 4.96 0.20151 
new_24 4.96 0.201665 
new_13 4.8 0.208238 
new_12 4.79 0.20889 
new_25 4.71 0.212439 
new_9 4.69 0.213289 
new_18 4.66 0.214394 
new_10 4.62 0.216314 
new_2 4.59 0.217709 
new_28 4.54 0.220145 
dem 4.24 0.235633 
new_26 3.54 0.282744 
new_8 3.17 0.315772 
new_19 2.92 0.342061 
cwr 2.8 0.356751 
new_14 2.67 0.37511 
new_17 2.62 0.381031 
new_31 2.56 0.39044 
new_30 2.46 0.406706 
war 2.14 0.467395 
new_36 1.98 0.50478 
new_23 1.95 0.513383 
stkptm 1.83 0.547918 
rev 1.81 0.552799 
new_11 1.77 0.566402 
cop 1.71 0.585388 
ass 1.48 0.674911 
con 1.48 0.676269 
ritptm 1.47 0.680291 
new_4 1.45 0.687877 
prgptm 1.22 0.821937 
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Table C17- outcomes of VIF test for panel c,  socio-political uncertainty and conflicts. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
new_21 4.25 0.235307 
new_20 4.2 0.237984 
new_24 4.15 0.241129 
new_34 3.94 0.253547 
inq 3.9 0.256644 
dem 3.85 0.259951 
new_16 3.83 0.260997 
new_32 3.83 0.261239 
new_27 3.76 0.26624 
new_22 3.75 0.266859 
new_35 3.67 0.272695 
new_28 3.63 0.275553 
new_7 3.62 0.276078 
new_18 3.56 0.281257 
new_15 3.54 0.282322 
new_9 3.44 0.290325 
new_25 3.41 0.293251 
new_13 3.35 0.298197 
new_2 3.32 0.301354 
new_38 3.03 0.329959 
new_19 2.8 0.35714 
new_37 2.79 0.358675 
new_26 2.78 0.35953 
new_12 2.7 0.3697 
cwr 2.69 0.371969 
new_14 2.53 0.395303 
new_8 2.3 0.434254 
new_36 2.14 0.468007 
new_30 2.06 0.484483 
new_31 2.03 0.493472 
new_10 2.01 0.497498 
new_1 1.98 0.50537 
new_17 1.87 0.534076 
new_4 1.75 0.572373 
new_33 1.75 0.57241 
war 1.71 0.584215 
rev 1.54 0.647793 
new_23 1.52 0.659688 
ass 1.43 0.699929 
new_5 1.41 0.710773 
ritptm 1.39 0.71902 
stkptm 1.34 0.745375 
prgptm 1.21 0.826205 
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Table C18- outcomes of VIF test for quality of governance. 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
rol 27.79 0.03598 
lnprt 19.93 0.050179 
new_7 16.68 0.059954 
rgq 12.45 0.080346 
cor 9.48 0.105439 
new_36 9.17 0.109005 
new_22 8.01 0.124848 
new_25 7.41 0.134954 
new_38 6.82 0.146557 
new_35 6.58 0.151918 
new_33 6.41 0.156022 
lngin 6.18 0.161789 
new_10 5.53 0.180825 
new_20 5.53 0.180883 
new_1 4.93 0.202642 
new_28 4.66 0.214537 
new_15 4.02 0.249045 
new_32 3.95 0.252945 
new_14 3.93 0.254663 
new_30 3.92 0.255381 
new_34 3.7 0.270348 
new_26 3.49 0.286824 
new_12 3.33 0.300131 
new_37 3.18 0.314897 
new_17 3.12 0.320955 
new_16 2.99 0.33496 
new_4 2.93 0.341244 
new_23 2.87 0.347999 
new_27 2.79 0.358469 
new_11 2.7 0.369921 
new_18 2.69 0.37107 
new_8 2.47 0.404762 
new_29 2.47 0.404906 
new_2 2.41 0.415395 
new_13 2.3 0.435171 
new_5 2.25 0.444598 
new_9 2.23 0.449067 
new_31 2.13 0.470456 
new_6 2.1 0.47715 
new_19 2.08 0.481687 
new_3 1.86 0.538347 
new_21 1.72 0.581072 
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